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Reynolds v. NFL:
An Unsettling Requiem for the Rozelle Rule
By RODERICK M. THOMPSON*
The public image of the professional athlete has undergone a
radical transformation over the last twenty years. Once the
subject of blind idolatry, the athlete was knocked off his pedes-
tal in the 1960's largely through media exposure which re-
vealed an all too human susceptibility to ordinary temptations.
In the 1970's, professional athletes fought hard to gain the dig-
nity of controlling their own destinies, as well as to realize
their financial worth.' Today they are often seen as greedy en-
trepreneurs in a different American tradition.2
Nowhere has the transformation been more visible than in
professional football. National Football League (NFL) Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle disciplined three star players for sus-
pected gambling connections during the 1960's.1 In 1968 the
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. In 1978 the average salary in the NFL was $62,585. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1979,











Miller, How Much They Made in the NFL, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 6, 1979, at 45, col. 1. See
generally Brody, The Impact of Litigation on Professional Sports, TRIAL, June 1978, at
35-38.
2. According to a recent fan opinion poll conducted for SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, most
fans believe the players are overpaid (62%), and are "greedier and more self-centered
than they used to be" (67%), but the majority also believe that players are now
smarter (69%), and that it is "acceptable" for them to earn "hundreds of thousands of
dollars" each year (68% in reference to individual sports, and 58% for team sports).
Kennedy & Williamson, The Fans: Are They Up In Arms?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July
31, 1978, at 34, 42.
3. Paul Hornung, Alex Karras, and Joe Namath were the players involved. Gar-
vey, The NFL Money Game: Players Want More, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1979, at 74, col.
2.
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National Football League Player's Association (NFLPA)
emerged as a viable, powerful union,4 and began its struggle for
"dignity."'
The focal point of the player-owner conflict was the league
Commissioner's authority to effectively bind a player to his
present team under the operation of the Rozelle Rule.' This
controversy was finally settled by the courts in Mackey v.
NFL,' where the Rozelle Rule was found to be invalid under
the antitrust laws. With this victory in hand, the NFLPA spon-
sored a class action by past and present players to recover
damages caused by the antitrust violation. The class action
was settled and given judicial approval in Alexander v. NFL.'
However, some players were dissatisfied with the settlement
and appealed. This gave the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, the same court which had earlier decided Mackey, an
opportunity to emphasize its belief in the collective bargaining
process as the proper method of player-management dispute
resolution.
Although the new Collective Bargaining Agreement was not
a part of the Alexander settlement, and hence not before the
court, the Eighth Circuit made it clear in Reynolds v. NFLI that
the Agreement's new player restraint rule,'0 replacing the in-
validated Rozelle Rule, would be immune from antitrust scru-
4. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 276-78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SPORTS & THE LAw]. The NFLPA gained official recognition as the players' exclusive
bargaining representative by NLRB certification in Jaunary of 1971. Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement between the NFLPA and the National Football League Manage-
ment Council (NFLMC) (Mar. 1, 1977), Preamble [hereinafter cited as Collective
Bargaining Agreement].
5. Garvey, supra note 3, at 74, col. 2. Mr. Garvey is the executive director of the
NFLPA.
6. See notes 65-71 and accompanying text, infra. See Goldstein, Out of Bounds
Under the Sherman Act? Player Restraints in Professional Team Sports, 4 PEPPERDINE
L. REv. 285 (1977); Note, National Football League Restrictions on Competitive Bidding
for Players' Services, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 613 (1975); Note, The Legality of the Rozelle
Rule and Related Practices in the National Football League, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 581
(1976).
7. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
8. 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977).
9. 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
10. The Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rule, Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, supra note 4, art. XV. See notes 246-58 and accompanying text, infra. For an
evaluation of the new rule from an antitrust perspective, see Roberts & Powers, Defin-
ing the Relationship Between Antitrust Law and Labor Law: Professional Sports and
the Current Legal Battleground, 19 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 395, 451-67 (1978).
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tiny under the labor exemption enunciated in Mackey. To
evaluate the propriety of this judicial self-restraint in applying
antitrust principles to player-owner controversies over rules
governing player allocation, it is necessary to begin with an
evaluation of the justifications behind league rules restraining
inter-team player movement in professional team sports.
Player Loyalty, Team Continuity and Competitive Balance
"Slavery went out of style 100 years ago," commented bas-
ketball player Phil Ford after learning he had been drafted by
the Kansas City Kings, an NBA team which he had, at least
initially, little or no desire to play for." Ford's reaction typifies
the recent resentment harbored by many professional athletes
toward the practice employed by all major professional team
sports leagues 2 of exclusively assigning a player's services to a
single team. 3
Under each league's rules, a player may not, without the per-
mission of his present team, negotiate with or contact any team
other than the one with which he is presently under contract.
Conversely, each team enjoyes the exclusive right to bargain
for and retain the services of any player already under con-
tract. There are undeniably some slavery-like qualities in the
operation of the various systems of restricting inter-team
player movement.' At the same time, professional sports
11. S.F. Chronicle, June 26, 1978, at 54, col. 1. Ford went on to explain, "I'm not
trying to be cocky but my happiness is also important, and I can't see myself happy in
Kansas City." Id. As of this writing, Ford appears content in Kansas City where he led
the Kings to a first place finish in the Midwest Division of the NBA. He was also
named Rookie of the Year for the 1978-79 season by a wide margin in media voting.
S.F. Chronicle, May 17, 1979, at 53, col. 1.
12. For the purposes of this Note, "major professional team sports" or "major pro-
fessional leagues" refer to baseball, basketball, hockey, and football. Together these
leagues employ approximately 2,482 athletes. Kennedy & Williamson, For The Athlete
How Much Is Too Much?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 24, 1978, at 34, 37.
13. Rod Carew, speaking about his ordeal while waiting to be traded, is another
example: "it's nervewracking-the wait, the frustration-it's terrible, I want every-
body to know I can't be bought, I am offended when I read all this stuff about the rich
New York Yankees and that what George (Steinbrenner) wants, George gets." S.F.
Chronicle, Feb. 2, 1979, at 55, col. 6. Carew has since been traded to the California
Angels. Senator Sam Ervin's comments are also germane: "The reserve clause
reduces a human being to a chattel, a possession like a piece of furniture. Manage-
ment may sell a man, trade him for another piece of property, or dump him on the
open market when it considers him of no more value. The player isn't a human being
any more, just a depreciating asset, like a machine." SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4,
at 235.
14. The various league rules are referred to generally herein as "player restraints."
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leagues are dependent on their entertainment appeal, and ath-
letes are performers in a contest played under imposed condi-
tions before an audience expecting a standardized product,
both at the stadium and on television. League officials have in-
sisted that these restrictions have produced the requisite con-
tinuity essential to successful team sport entertainment. They
have specifically contended that the presence of
league-imposed restraints on player movement through the
years,'5 was and still is, essential to team sports' entertainment
value.16 Three principal justifications are put forward in sup-
port of restraints on inter-team player movement: (1) preserv-
ing the competitive balance within the league; (2) promoting
player loyalty and thus the integrity of the sport; and (3)
preventing an uncontrolled bidding war between team owners
for the best players' services.
First, because team owners themselves engineer player
trades which affect team strength, the effectiveness of player
restraints in preserving a competitive balance is open to ques-
tion. The simple reality is that the desired balance has never
existed.'" The initial justification for player restraints thus
reduces itself to an intuitively attractive but unprovable the-
ory.'" Until effective equalization measures are imple-
The phrases "reserve clause" and "option clause," although having a more narrow
technical meaning (referring to specific standardized clauses in player contracts), are
frequently used interchangeably with "player restraints" in other sources. For a de-
tailed examination of the NFL's system of player restraints, see notes 53-64 and accom-
panying text, infra.
15. The evolution of these rules (commonly called "reserve clauses") can be
traced back to a secret agreement among baseball owners in 1879. Each team owner
simply agreed to let each of the other owners "reserve" the contracts of five players,
ensuring each owner the exclusive contractual rights to the designated players. The
number was later increased to 11 in 1883, to 12 in 1885, and finally to 14 in 1887. Canes,
The Social Benefits ofRestrictions on Team Quality, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS
BUSINEsS 81, 84 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
16. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 5, Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976).
17. Canes, supra note 15, at 82 n.2; SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 229-30. See
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 5, Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
18. "Doggedly, despite all evidence to the contrary, the guardians of the profes-
sional games have always maintained that any tinkering with the system would upset
the 'delicate mechanisms of competitive balance.' Reserve clause, antitrust, merger,
any and every issue is, it seems, reason for them to unfurl the banner of competitive
balance. There is only one response to the wailing: What competitive balance?" Ken-
nedy & Williamson, Money the Monster Threatening Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July
17, 1978, at 28, 80.
19. This has led one commentator to conclude: "The theoretical conclusion is that
the reserve clause could balance competition only if player trades and sales were pro-
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1979] ROZELLE RULE 399
mented,2 0 it is doubtful that any significant balancing of team
playing strengths will occur, and the effectiveness of player re-
straints in preserving a nonexistent competitive balance on the
playing field will remain, at best, open to speculation.2 1
Secondly it is contended, restrictions on inter-team player
movement foster player loyalty and enhance the integrity of
the sport. Initially it was argued that by binding a player to a
particular team he would be more likely to develop long term
loyalty to the team and its fans. Thus, the chances of his
"cheating" would be correspondingly reduced.2 2 Perhaps be-
cause proponents of player restraints have realized that an
athlete predisposed toward cheating in violation of league
rules is unlikely to change his ways as a result of other league-
enforced rules, the modern justification centers on appear-
ances. For example, if a player, after recent contract negotia-
tions with other clubs (prohibited under conventional player
restraints)2 3 were to have a very poor performance which ma-
terially enhanced the position of one of the teams with whom
he had just negotiated, his loyalty and motivation might be
doubted.24 The resulting suspicion and possible accusations, it
is argued, would greatly undermine the appearance of integrity
hibited-certainly an undesirable and unenforceable proposition. Empirical investiga-
tions find no discernible relation between the closeness of competition on the field and
the degree of competition in the market for players." Noll, Alternatives in Sports Pol-
icy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 411, 415 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
20. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, while assessing the impact of the player
draft, commented, "we think that two factors contribute at least as much as the player
draft in producing and maintaining a competitive balance in the league- television
revenues and coaching changes." Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1184 n.46
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original). Interestingly, in the 1978-79 season the NFL,
through utilization of a "parity" scheduling formula (under which the teams with the
poorest won-lost records the previous year were given the easiest schedules), did
achieve significant strides toward team equalization.
21. Football players have begun to question the competitive desires of team own-
ers, alleging that the $5 million in television revenues guaranteed each team for each of
the next four years has taken away the economic incentive to win. Oates, The NFL's
TV Deal: Winning Isn't Everything, S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 2, 1978, at 51, col. 1. See text
accompanying note 265 infra.
22. Cheating by professional players takes two principal forms: "point shaving,"
where a player purposely scores fewer points than he is able to, typically at the behest
of a gambler trying to beat the "point spread"; and "throwing" games where a player
intentionally tries to lose.
23. Recent "reserve" or "option" clauses specify certain negotiation periods when
a player is free to bargain with other teams. E.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement,
supra note 4, art. XV, § 7 (Feb. I to Apr. 15).
24. See Noll, The Team Sports Industry: An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS 1, 4 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
of the sport."
The answer to this contention is twofold. Under existing
league structures gambling or cheating is prohibited and its oc-
currence has been rare;26 moreover, when suspicions are
aroused, for whatever reasons, the best way to alleviate them
and restore integrity is through more direct measures such as
investigation and closer monitoring. 27 A player's loyalty to his
team and its fans is a desirable end in itself.8 However, such
affinity cannot be produced involuntarily, and hence cannot be
a serious justification for the imposition of player restraints.
The final justification at the center of the controversy over
player restraints is prevention of uncontrolled bidding in order
to ensure a competitive league comprised of the maximum
number of profit-making teams. The fear is that the wealthiest
owners, left unbridled, would soon have all the quality players
under contract. Before too long all but the most attractive
teams would be unable to compete on the playing field,29 and
the league would thus be doomed to financial ruin. Implicit in
this argument are two premises: first, that the wealthier, more
attractive teams, offering desirable climates, coaching, facili-
ties and other benefits, will indeed sign all the talented players
possible, and, secondly, that the resulting concentration of tal-
ent will reduce consumption of the entertainment product.30
Assuming for the moment that run-away league champions
will result from the first premise, the latter premise does have
25. See SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 230.
26. See id.
27. "In sum, gambling is prohibited and is policed, and suspicions can and have
arisen from irrational sources and even from league efforts to dispel it. Thus, using
reserve and option systems to dispel suspicion, particularly on the theory that players
will be suspected of cheating for future employers, is an unnecessary, ineffectual and
overly burdensome thing to do." Id. at 232.
28. To the fans, a mediocre yet familiar player may sometimes be preferable to an
unappreciative superstar waiting to jump at the chance to move on to another city for
more money. But league rules have long allowed player transfer via trades regardless
of fan sentiment. A player's loyalties are simply unrelated to the presence of player
restraints. For an analysis of this and related questions, see Note, Keeping The Illu-
sion Alive: The Public Interest In Professional Sports, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 48 (1978).
29. "Attractive" is used here broadly, and includes any characteristic generally at-
tractive to athletes, such as location, economic or social climate, winning reputation, or
high salaries. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) for a more detailed analysis of the factors
that contribute to team attractiveness.
30. See SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 225.
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some empirical support.3 ' The crucial question is thus
whether the elimination of restrictions on inter-team player
movement would result in a disproportionate number of the
best players congregating on the few most desirable teams,
and if so, how would this affect the sports' popularity? The
conventional answer, and the one still apparently accepted by
the courts,3 2 is that a few teams would acquire the best players
and this would inevitably cause a decrease in public interest,
consumption, and total league revenues. However, the first
premise does not find support in economic theory.33 The eco-
nomically rational team owner already in possession of many
talented players will offer to pay a talented free agent 34 only
the marginal increase in revenue his acquisition would pro-
duce. Because the owner's already talented team is presumed
to have been previously successful, the offer to the free agent
will be significantly less than the amount a losing team owner,
devoid of talent, would offer the same player. Hence, at least
in theory, it appears unlikely that unrestricted player move-
ment would cause the degree of'talent concentration feared.
31. "[T)he league as a whole will derive 50% more revenue from gate receipts if its
pennant winner wins 57%% of its games rather than 75% of them." Id.
32. In the Reynolds decision, discussed at length at notes 156-207 and accompany-
ing text, infra, Judge Gibson stated the following proposition without citing authority:
Precise and detailed rules must of necessity govern . . . the acquisition,
number and engagement of players. While some freedom of movement after
playing out a contract is in order, complete freedom of movement would result
in the best franchises acquiring most of the top players. Some leveling and
balancing rules appear necessary to keep the various teams on a competitive
basis, without which public interest in any sport quickly fades.
584 F.2d at 287. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 610-11; United States v. NFL, 116 F.
Supp. 319, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1207 (MacKinnon,
J., concurring and dissenting).
33. See Quirk & Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League, in
GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINEss, at 33 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
34. As used in this Note, a free agent is a player free to negotiate. Subject to vari-
ous league imposed restraints, teams may or may not be able to negotiate and/or enter
a contractual agreement with the free agent.
35. [A] good player is worth more to a poor team, all other things being
equal. While New York will have more good players, on average, than Mem-
phis, they will not have them all, for the first good player in Memphis will have
a greater impact on team revenues than adding another star to a star-studded
New York team. What the final balance of talent will be is difficult to under-
stand, but it will never be a situation in which most teams are completely un-
competitive, for that costs both the bad and the good teams, fan interest and
revenues.
Economists R. Noll & B. Okner, quoted in SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 227-28.
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Of course, the presence of many non-economic factors renders
all such predictions speculative to some degree.
It is precisely because of this uncertainty that many closely
involved in professional team sports, including some players,
oppose any significant alteration of the status quo. After all, as
a whole, the professional sports industry continues to pros-
per.3 1 While some players do sincerely seek to change the sys-
tem radically, ending their enslavement, others want nothing
more than a greater share in this prosperity. Thus it is not sur-
prising that money, not the ideal of free player movement, sup-
plies the unity necessary to support attacks on player
restraints. Under league-imposed restrictions on inter-team
movement, players are unable to realize the full value they
could command for their services in an open market. Begin-
ning in the late 1960's, professional athletes began the assault
on player restraints on two fronts: through antitrust actions 38
alleging that restraints operate as concerted refusals to deal or
group boycotts3 9 on the part of the league and its owners; and
36. Id. at 235.
37. "[Ujnder the terms of the National Football League's new television contract
each of the 28 clubs will receive $20 million in the next four years-more than the
average franchise was worth when Commissioner Pete Rozelle signed with the net-
works last year." Oates, The NFL's TV Deal: Winning Isn't Everything, S.F. Chronicle,
Aug. 2, 1978, at 51, col. 3.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor ..... (emphasis added.) There has been a veritable flood of sports
antitrust litigation in recent years. With the exception of baseball (see notes 75-76 and
accompanying text, infra) all major professional team sports have been found subject
to the Sherman Act's prohibitions against "combinations . . . in restraint of trade," 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049
(C.D. Cal. 1971); Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1977) (basketball); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kapp v. NFL, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 616 n.19; Alexander v. NFL, 1977-
2 Trade Cases at 72, 984; Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1177 n.11; Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum v. NFL, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), 1 62,617 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (foot-
ball); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn.
1977); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (hockey).
39. This imprecise concept may be generally defined as any form of concerted ac-
tion on the part of competitors resulting in a refusal to do business ("to deal") with
potential customers. Group boycotts are often held to be illegal per se. See Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U.S. 341 (1963). However, in the context of professional sports, courts have heard
the proffered justifications behind the boycotts. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at
1183-85; Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
They have found the restraints to be legal on occasion. Deesen v. Professional Golfers
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through formation of players' associations," pooling strength
to gain leverage at the bargaining table.4 '
The Rozelle Rule
Nowhere has the players' assault upon the citadel been more
bitterly fought than in professional football42 To fully appreci-
ate the system under attack, the history of player restraints in
the NFL must be examined. Originally the league employed a
perpetual reserve clause similar to the one employed at the
time in baseball.4 1 In effect, each team in the league could re-
serve a designated number of players with the assurance that
no other club would sign them. A team's exclusive right to the
services of any player so 'reserved' was unlimited in duration.
In 1947, the league replaced the perpetual reserve rule with the
option clause." This clause, substantially unchanged to this
date, is required in all NFL player contracts, and provides that
at the expiration of the contract term, the club may renew the
contract for an additional year. At the end of that year a
player is said to have "played out his option." He is then free
to negotiate and sign with any other club.
In 1963, R.C. Owens played out his option with the San Fran-
cisco 49ers and subsequently signed with the Baltimore Colts.
At that time the league rules were silent as to whether a team
Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (upheld boycott of
players not playing in minimum number of tournaments); Molinas v. NBA, 190 F.
Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (upheld boycott of players participating in illegal gambling).
See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRuST ANALYSIS PROBLEMS, TEXT & CASES, 380-422 (2d ed. 1974); L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 229-64 (1977); ANTTrRUsT ADVISER
§ 1.32 (C. Hill ed., 2d ed. 1978).
40. Briefly, the collectivization of professional players may be outlined as follows:
(1) baseball players organized their present system in 1946, but Marvin Miller's ap-
pearance in 1966 as executive director marked the beginning of real power; (2) Bob
Cousy created the NBA Players' Association in 1952, and it emerged as a viable power
in 1963; (3) the National Hockey League Players' Association obtained a formal "Rec-
ognition Agreement" in 1967, some 10 years after its inception; and (4) the NFLPA
organized in 1956 and solidified in 1968. SPORTS & THE LAW, supra note 4, at 267-76. See
generally Lowell, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Team Sport Industry, 38
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1974).
41. The increase in bargaining power gained by players' associations has, as a by-
product, effectively emasculated the antitrust attack. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust
Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE
L.J. 1 (1971).
42. See text accompanying notes 66-77, infra.
43. SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 111; Canes, supra note 15, at 87 n.16.
44. SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 111 n.3.
45. Standard Player Contract For The NFL, para. 10 (1972).
1979]1 403
COMM/ENT
in the 49ers' situation should receive any compensation. The
NFL and its member clubs swiftly amended the league Consti-
tution and By-Laws so that a team like the 49ers would never
again be left without adequate compensation." League Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle was given sole authority to compensate
the free agent's former club with players and draft choices
from the acquiring club. This provision of the NFL Constitu-
tion became known as the Rozelle Rule." Though the two
teams are initially free to work out a mutually agreeable solu-
tion, the specter of Rozelle's unreviewable discretion may have
pressured some acquiring teams to accept less-than-optimum
compensation."
The Rozelle Rule is one of five devices employed by the NFL
to control inter-team player movement. Collectively these de-
vices comprise the so-called "reserve system."4 9 Today the
First Refusal/Compensation Rule" has replaced the Rozelle
Rule, while the other components of the system have remained
relatively unchanged. The second device is the annual player
draft. This is the vehicle through which NFL teams acquire vir-
tually all their players. Each team is allowed to select a single
player, acquiring exclusive rights to the draftee's services, dur-
ing each of 12 rounds.5 1 The drafted player must either sign
46. SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 111; Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 610.
47. The NFL prefers the formal bargaining name, the "player of like quality" rule.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3, Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall thereupon
become a free agent and shall no longer be considered a member of the team
of that club following the expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player,
becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter signed [sic I a contract with
a different club in the League, then, unless mutually satisfactory arrange-
ments have been concluded between the two League clubs, the Commissioner
may name and then award to the former club one or more players, from the
Active, Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection choices) of the
acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair and equi-
table; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.
NFL Const. & By-Laws, art. XII, § 12.1(H).
48. From the Rozelle Rule's inception in 1963 through the 1974 season, 34 free
agents signed with other teams. In 27 of those instances the teams involved were able
to reach agreement on compensation. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 611. See note 65
and text accompanying notes 59-65, infra.
49. Note, Professional Sports: Restraining the League Commissioner's Preroga-
tives In An Era of Player Mobility, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 281, 289; Mackey v. NFL, 407
F. Supp. at 1004-05.
50. For a detailed discussion of the new rule, see notes 220-38 and accompanying
text, infra.
51. The NFL player draft, as it was conducted in 1968, was recently held to violate
the Sherman Act. The court, per Circuit Judge Wilkey, indicated that a less restrictive
404 [Vol. 2
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with the team that drafted him or not play in the league that
year.52 To participate, the newly drafted player must, like any
other NFL player, sign a standard player contract.53 The third
device employed by the reserve system is the standard player
contract, which provides that the player will "comply with and
be bound by" the league Constitution, By-Laws, and decisions
of the league Commissioner." Thus, before any athlete can be
eligible to compete, he must agree to all the provisions of the
'reserve system' in addition to the Commissioner's power to
make "final, conclusive, and unappealable" decisions. Also
contained in the contract is the option clause, the fourth re-
strictive device.56  Not only is the player expressly bound by
the league's rules, he must also agree to his club's power to
exercise its options and renew his contract 57 for another year
without his consent.
The reserve system also requires team owners to comply
with its terms. They are prohibited from negotiating with any
player under contract with another team, including the option
year of the contract under the last restrictive device, the "tam-
pering rule."" Because no team may "tamper" with the exclu-
draft might be permissible; "a player draft can survive scrutiny under the rule of rea-
son only if it is demonstrated to have positive, economically procompetitive benefits
that offset its anticompetitive effects, or, at least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish
legitimate business purposes and to have a net anticompetitive effect that is insubstan-
tial." Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (1978) (emphasis in original).
52. Under the current Collective Bargaining Agreement, a drafted player must re-
ceive a minimum salary offer (a "required tender") by June 7 following the draft on
May 1 in order for the club to retain its exclusive right. Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, supra note 4, art. XIII, §§ 3-4. It must be emphasized that the discussion in the
text is a description of the system as it existed under the Rozelle Rule, and at that time
a drafted player had no similar means of escape. See notes 227-38 and accompanying
text, infra.
53. NFL Const. & By-Laws, art. XV, § 15.6; Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1004.
54. Standard Player Contract for the NFL, para. 4 (1972).
55. Id.
56. Id. at para. 10.
57. A player then was entitled to a minimum of 90% of his salary in the option
year. Today the figure is 110%, and a veteran of four or more years is no longer re-
quired to have an option clause. See note 234, infra.
58. The tampering rule provides:
If a member club or any officer, shareholder, director, partner, employee,
agent or representative thereof, or any person holding an interest in said club
shall tamper, negotiate with, or make an offer to a player on the Active, Re-
serve or Selection List of another member club, then unless the offending club
shall clearly prove to the Commissioner that such action was unintentional,
the offending club, in addition to being subject to all other penalties provided
in the Constitution and By-Laws, shall lose its selection choice in the next
succeeding Selection Meeting in the same round in which the affected player
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sive rights held by another team to a player's services, all
players are effectively bound to their present teams for the du-
ration of the period under contract plus the option year.
In sum, the NFL reserve system allows players to change
teams on their own volition in a single, narrowly defined man-
ner. A player must first refuse to sign a new contract and play
out his option year, then he may negotiate with any interested
club.
Under the operation of the Rozelle Rule, assuming he could
find acceptable terms with a desirable club, he then had to
hope his new team either could reach agreement with his for-
mer club on compensation or was courageous enough to accept
the Commissioner's wholly discretionary award of compensa-
tion.
The power given to the Commissioner under the Rozelle
Rule is noteworthy. In the event the two clubs involved are
unable to reach agreement "the Commissioner may ...
[award compensation] in his sole discretion . . . [and] such
decision by the Commissioner is final and conclusive."5  This
broad discretionary authority is significant in two respects.
First, the very existence of authority to award compensation
when a free agent changes teams is not common to all profes-
sional team sports."o Secondly, it is indicative of the authorita-
was originally selected in the Selection Meeting in which he was originally
chosen. If such affected player was never selected in any Selection Meeting,
the Commissioner shall determine the round in which the offending club shall
lose its selection choice. Additionally, if the Commissioner decided such of-
fense was intentional, the Commissioner shall have the power to fine the of-
fending club and may award the offended club 50% of the amount of the fine
imposed by the Commissioner. In all such cases the offended club must first
certify to the Commissioner that such an offense has been committed.
NFL Const. & By-Laws, art. IX, § 9.2.
Roy Kroc, owner of the San Diego Padres, ran into trouble with baseball's tampering
rule. Near the end of yet another disappointing season, Kroc made the mistake of pub-
licly voicing his plans to lure quality players to San Diego. He said he was "willing to
spend $5 million to $10 million" and specifically would "try signing Graig Nettles and
Joe Morgan if they became free agents this fall." S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 14, 1979, at 46, col.
4. Because Morgan and Nettles were still under contract and had not attained free
agent status, Kroc was disciplined by the league for tampering. Despite Kroc's apolo-
gies to the clubs involved and to the league for his "slip of the tongue," he was fined
$100,000 and has decided to relinquish control of the team to his son-in-law. Kroc,
founder and chairman of McDonald's, concluded, "[t Ihere's a lot more future in ham-
burgers than in baseball." S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 25, 1979, at 42, col. 3.
59. NFL Const. & By-Laws, art. XII, § 12.1(H).
60. Although hockey and basketball have similar compensation rules, baseball
does not, and this may be a major reason why football can achieve greater team con-
tinuity. One sports writer believes "the reason for so little activity in football's free
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rian manner in which Rozelle has steered the NFL on a course
toward continuing financial success while skillfully placating
the competing interests of the fans, players, and owners.6'
Nonetheless, it is true that Rozelle was chosen by the owners
from their own ranks," and it is apparent that at least some of
his sympathies still lie in that direction."
In practice, Commissioner Rozelle was rarely called upon to
exercise his discretionary power;64 but there is no better indi-
cation of the Rozelle Rule's restrictive impact on player move-
ment than the infrequency of its implementation. For once
team owners became aware of the strict price the Commis-
sioner was likely to exact, typically the team's high draft
choices in future drafts, even the most talented free agents
were seldom worth the price. 65  The Rozelle Rule, as imple-
agent market-as opposed to baseball's-has to do with compensation. Baseball
teams don't have to compensate a player's old team when they sign a free agent. NFL
teams do." Miller, Compensation Slows Football Free Agents, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 24,
1978, at 45, col. 1.
61. Rozelle comments, "In this job, you're going to make someone reasonably
happy or not so happy with everything you do that affects them. . . . What we try to do
here is reject those policies that would give an inordinate edge to any one of the three
[fans, players and owners]. We've got to keep a balance so that all three get a fair
shake." Grunwald, Pete Rozelle: Supersalesman Behind the Superbowl, Marin County
Independent Journal, Jan. 21, 1979, (Family Weekly) at 6, col. 4.
62. Rozelle was general manager of the Los Angeles Rams at the time of his selec-
tion as Commissioner in 1960. Id. at col. 1.
63. An example of Rozelle's tendency to view matters from the owners' perspec-
tive is his reaction in 1971 to the proposal to lift the television blackout of home games:
"If a club announced in advance of its ticket sales, that all of its home games would be
telecast locally the impact on ticket sales for the season or on a game-by-game basis
could be dramatic. Fans could hold back on the buying of tickets to await the progress
of the team during the season, skip cold weather games, buy tickets only to particular
games of their choice, and generally keep the ticket sale pattern in a state of continu-
ing confusion." Letter to Cornell Law Review, reprinted in Blackout of Sporting Events
on TV: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Communications of Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 189-90 (1972).
64. The Commissioner made compensation awards on only four occasions during
the operation of the Rozelle Rule. See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1004.
65. Two examples are illustrative: In 1967 David Parks played out his option with
the San Francisco 49ers and eventually signed with the New Orleans Saints in 1968 as
a free agent. Despite the fact that Parks was past the peak of his career, when the
clubs failed to reach a compromise, Rozelle awarded Kevin Hardy, the Saints' 1969 first
round draft pick. By 1972, when Dick Gordon of the Chicago Bears attained free agent
status, the chill of Rozelle's past awards was pronounced. Although Gordon was
sought by many teams, none would agree to sign him, apparently believing that the
Bears would never agree to fair compensation as long as an award from the Commis-
sioner was an alternative. The result was that Gordon remained unsigned as the 1973
season began. At this point Rozelle, diagnosing the cause of the impasse, announced
that his compensation award would be a first round draft pick. Gordon was eventually
mented by Commissioner Rozelle, went beyond its original
purpose as an ostensibly neutral tool for resolution of disputes
between NFL clubs over reasonable compensation. Through
excessively harsh awards, Rozelle used the rule more as an ef-
fective means of deterring teams from signing free agents. De-
spite the existence of the option clause, players were unable to
realize the value their services might otherwise command.
Shortly after entering the four year 1970 Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, the National Football League Player's Associa-
tion (NFLPA) became increasingly militant in its demands for
greater player freedom." It was the NFLPA's dogged determi-
nation to prevail on the "freedom issues,"" especially the elim-
ination of the Rozelle Rule, the option clause, and the
Commissioner's power as final arbiter of all disputes," which
led to the longest players' strike in the history of professional
sports, July 1 through August 11, 1974.9 The strike ended only
because the NFLPA agreed to an indefinite cooling off period
and to play the 1974 season.70 Animosities continued, and bar-
gaining remained unproductive until agreement was finally
reached almost three years later on March 1, 1977.71 During the
interim the NFLPA filed with the NLRB an unfair labor prac-
tice charge against the owners' bargaining representative, the
National Football League Management Council (NFLMC) al-
leging, inter alia, refusal to bargain in good faith.72 But it was
not through resort to labor law that real progress was made.
signed by the L.A. Rams. As a plaintiff in Mackey, Gordon was found to have been
damaged by the Rozelle Rule. Id. at 1011.
66. SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 279.
67. Initially this term appeared to mean simply contractual freedom. But it later
became an emotional rallying cry for the players and soon encompassed freedom in
the broadest sense. Then NFLPA president Kermit Alexander's reaction to the
player's victory on the "freedom issues" in Mackey is typical. "This decision confirms
that we have been right all along on the freedom issues. The Rozelle Rule is anti-
American, and the court has seen fit to strike it down." Mackey Claims Victory for
Every American, THE AUDIBLE, Jan. 1976, at 3, col. 3. The lead plaintiff, John Mackey,
remarked that "this was a victory for every American. It means that large corporations
cannot own people. It proves that truth, justice and freedom still prevail." Id.
68. SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 280. See Goldstein, supra note 6.
69. SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 279-85.
70. Id. at 286.
71. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730, at p. 72,997 (D. Minn. 1977).
72. NLRB Case No. 2-CA-13379, reprinted in FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). See
SPORTS & THE LAw, supra note 4, at 281, 287.
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The NFLPA, as far back as January 1972,73 had decided to
pursue the alternative avenue of attack-filing an antitrust ac-
tion. The courts have generally treated professional football as
an ordinary business, 74 and the United States Supreme Court
has specifically held the business of football, unlike baseball,75
amenable to the antitrust laws.76 Although resort to the judi-
cial process was predictably time-consuming, the results
proved far more advantageous to both parties than anything
accomplished in collective bargaining. As will be seen below, it
is unlikely that any agreement could have been reached with-
out the impetus supplied by the Mackey decision.
Mackey v. NFL: A Victory for Player Freedom?
In its January 1972 meeting,.the NFLPA's Board of Repre-
sentatives decided to take the Rozelle Rule to court. Initially,
the complaint asked for injunctive relief, monetary damages,
and a class action recovery.79 However, in the second amended
complaint, the class action allegation was dropped."o The dis-
trict court, per Judge Larson, found the Rozelle Rule to be an
73. Player Association Reps Began Legal Action in 1972, THE AUDIBLE, Jan. 1976, at
6, col. 2.
74. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (television and radio
broadcasts of football games are not immune from the antitrust laws); United States v.
Pro Football, Inc., 514 F.2d 1396 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (ticket prices subject to
wage-price guidelines).
75. Professional baseball was found not to be engaged in interstate commerce and
hence not cognizable to the antitrust laws. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Reasoning that if
Congress had wanted to subject baseball to the antitrust laws they would have acted
legislatively, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the result of Federal Baseball on the
principles of stare decisis. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). See
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
76. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The Court's comments on Federal Base-
ball are instructive: "If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is suffi-
cient to answer . .. that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time
we would have no doubts [that it would be subject to the antitrust laws]." Id. at 452.
77. See text accompanying notes 133-39, infra.
78. John Mackey was then president of the NFLPA, and all the members of the
Board of Representatives, with the exception of the Super Bowl participants, Miami
and Dallas, joined him as named plaintiffs. By the time the District Court's opinion
was announced on December 27, 1975, almost all of the named plaintiffs were either on
different teams or out of the game entirely. Player Association Reps Began Legal Ac-
tion in 1972, THE AUDIBLE, Jan. 1976, at 6.
79. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1000, 1002.
80. Id. Cf Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases $ 61,730 (D. Minn. 1978), affd sub
nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978) (class action). See notes 140-43 and
accompanying text, infra.
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antitrust violation, and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
It held that the plaintiffs were damaged in their person and
property, but postponed determination of actual damages."'
Specifically, the court determined that professional football
is subject to the antitrust laws,8 2 and that the Rozelle Rule, in
conjunction with the other restrictive devices contained in the
NFL's reserve system,83 operated as a concerted refusal to deal
and as a group boycott by the team owners.84 Further, the
court found that such anti-competitive practices were per se
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Alternatively, be-
cause considerable evidence was admitted on the issue of rea-
sonableness, the court found the Rozelle Rule to be invalid
under the Rule of Reason as well.
Perhaps most significant was the court's rejection of the
NFL's claimed labor exemption to the antitrust laws. At com-
mon law, and in the early years of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
unionization and any type of concerted labor activity was seen
as an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade." When Con-
gress passed the Clayton Act in 1914, it included an express
antitrust immunity for most union activities, now known as the
81. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1003. The Alexander settlement included
$2,200,000 for the Mackey plaintiffs. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 1 61,730, at p.
72,997 (D. Minn. 1977).
82. Id.
83. See notes 49-70 and accompanying text, supra.
84. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1007.
85. Id. The rationale for the per se treatment was outlined by the Supreme Court
in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "There are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and there-
fore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." More specifically, the Court has found, "Group boy-
cotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held
to be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations that they
were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they 'fixed
or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deteriora-
tion in quality.' [citations). Even when they operated to lower prices or temporarily to
stimulate competition they were banned." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
86. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1007. The Rule of Reason necessitates a full-
blown judicial inquiry into the economics behind a challenged practice. The court
must determine if a justifiable, procompetitive purpose exists and, if so, whether the
restraint is more restrictive than reasonably necessary. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 186-97 (1977); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.d 1173, 1180
(D.C. Cir. 1978). See notes 95-103 and accompanying text, infra.
87. A. GOLDMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW, 6-
8, 12-14 (1976); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, 621 (1976).
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labor exemption."8 Nevertheless, union action continued to be
found violative of the antitrust laws for some time.89 Finally,
aided by the clear Congressional mandate contained in the fed-
eral labor legislation of the 1930's, the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws received judicial recognition in the early 1940's.90
Against this background, the court ruled that the NFL, as a
non-labor group, could not escape antitrust liability through
assertion of the labor exemption. Only labor groups, it rea-
soned, can claim the benefits of the labor exemption.9' Even
assuming arguendo that the NFL somehow could fall within its
reach, the labor exemption was nevertheless held inapplicable
for two reasons. First, the court found the Rozelle Rule was
not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining because it was
illegal under the antitrust laws,92 and secondly, it was not the
88. 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976),
89. Because the statute applied only to individuals "lawfully carrying out legiti-
mate objects," the courts were able to greatly narrow the exemption to union activity
then felt to be "legitimate." Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). This
decision and its progeny "continued to deny full effect to Congress' intention to protect
concerted labor activity. . . ." Note, Labor Law--Antitrust-Application of Sherman
Act to Labor Union, 50 TuL. L. REV. 418, 420 (1976).
90. See id. at 422.
The cumulative effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA finally re-
sulted in the Supreme Court's recognition of the congressional labor policy in
two landmark cases. In a 1940 case, Apex Hoisery Co. v. Leader [310 U.S. 469
(1940) 1, the Court held that although the very nature of successful union activ-
ity tended to limit an employer's competitive freedom by eliminating price va-
riance based on differences in labor standards, such side effects would not
make a strike illegal under the Sherman Act. One year later, in Hutcheson, the
Court, recognizing that the antitrust laws were unsuited for regulation of labor
relations, held that a union's activities would be exempt from the antitrust
laws so long as the union acted out of self-interest and did not combine with
nonlabor groups to achieve its goals.
Id., citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
Gradually, as the case law developed, the labor exemption was applied in contexts
seemingly outside its statutory contours. Soon it became apparent that in reality two
distinct labor exemptions existed. First, there was a comparatively narrow "statutory
exemption" [15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976)] protecting only specified union activi-
ties. Second, there was a judge-made exemption, broadly protecting federal labor pol-
icy. The existence of this latter "nonstatutory exemption" was recently made explicit
in Connell Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). See
text accompanying note 105, infra. See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 87, at 621-38;
Note, Labor Law-Supreme Court Holds That Labor Unions Are Not Exempt from An-
titrust Statutes, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1975).
91. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1008.
92. As the court of appeals pointed out, this conclusion was reached through circu-
lar reasoning. If upheld, it would completely eliminate the labor exemption, since ap-
plication of the labor exemption presupposes an antitrust violation. Thus the very fact
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product of serious arms-length bargaining.9 3
The judgment granting plaintiffs a permanent injunction was
stayed pending appeal." The district court's decision was
hailed by the NFLPA as the "most important decision in the
history of professional team sports.""
The Eighth Circuit opinion, decided some ten months later,
affirmed the lower court's finding of antitrust illegality.96 How-
ever, the court refused to mechanically apply the per se rule to
professional football, reasoning that the unusual business
characteristics of the sport rendered it inappropriate to apply a
rule fashioned from traditional business precepts.97 Addition-
ally, it found lacking a key justification for the per se rule:
avoidance of complex inquiries into the industry economics in
question.9 8 The district court had already devoted considera-
ble time and energy to an investigation of the business of pro-
fessional football.9 9
The court then examined the Rozelle Rule under the Rule of
Reason.1 0 Without deciding whether some form of inter-team
compensation for voluntary player movement might be essen-
tial to the League's competitive balance, the court concluded
of antitrust illegality cannot also be grounds for denying an established immunity to
the operation of the antitrust laws. See notes 117-18 and accompanying text, infra.
93. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1008-10.
94. Id. at 1011.
95. Rozelle Rule Illegal, THE AUDIBLE, Jan. 1976, at 1, col. 3. Ed Garvey, executive
director of the NFLPA, assessed the impact of the court's decision on the fate of the
Rozelle Rule, "Bargaining won't make it legal; in all probability appeals won't make it
legal. The fact is that professional football players are the first athletes in history to
have freedom. The owners may delay it for awhile, but when they see 'light at the end
of the tunnel' it will be an onrushing locomotive called the 'Freedom Express.'" Gar-
vey, Impact of Ruling Tremendous, THE AUDIBLE, Jan. 1976, at 3, col. 2. It should be
noted that appeal did produce a way for bargaining to make a similar rule legal. See
note 197 and accompanying text, infra.
96. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 606.
97. Id. at 619.
98. Id. at 619-20.
99. Id. at 620. The district court heard 63 witnesses, examined over 400 exhibits,
and compiled a trial transcript of over 11,000 pages. 407 F. Supp. at 1002. The entire
Mackey transcript was later incorporated into the Alexander record. Alexander v.
NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730, at p. 72,986 (D. Minn. 1977).
100. For more detailed analyses of the court's reasoning, see Note, The Eighth Cir-
cuit Suggests a Labor Exemption From Antitrust Laws for Collectively Bargained La-
bor Agreements in Professional Sports, 21 Sr. Louis U. L.J. 565, 570-78 (1977); Note,
Antitrust-Professional Football-The Rozelle Rule as an Unreasonable Restraint of
Trade, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 121 (1977); Note, The Sherman Act and Professional Team
Sports: The NFL Rozelle Rule Invalid Under the Rule of Reason, Mackey v. National
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), 9 CoNN. L. REV. 336 (1977).
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that the Rozelle Rule "is significantly more restrictive than
necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might have in
this regard.""o' The rule was found unduly restrictive in three
aspects: (1) in its application to players of all levels of talent
when only 'star' player movement was alleged to be destruc-
tive; (2) in its perpetual, unlimited duration; and (3) in its com-
plete failure to provide procedural safeguards. 0 2 Because of
these deficiencies, the Rozelle Rule, as enforced, was held to be
an unreasonable restraint of trade within the meaning of the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 0 3
However, before finding the antitrust violation, the circuit
court gave much more serious attention to the NFL's asserted
labor exemption than did the district court.0 ' Analysis pro-
ceeded in light of a recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, Connell Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local 100,1os
which for the first time expressly stated that the labor exemp-
tion is actually comprised of two distinct exemptions. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority in the 5 to 4 decision, found
that the exemption consisted of both an express statutory im-
munity for certain labor activities,1 0 6 and a nonstatutory ex-
101. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 622.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Sherman Act reads in pertinent part, "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
104. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 622. See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1008-10.
105. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). See St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976).
106. 421 U.S. at 622. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUsT, 723
(1977):
The labor exemption is also the product of several statutes. Section 6 of the
Clayton Act [15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)] states that labor is not an article of com-
merce and that the antitrust laws should not forbid labor organizations. Sec-
tion 20 of that Act [29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976) ] limits the power of federal courts to
grant injunctions in labor disputes and lists certain labor activities which
should not be held to violate any law of the United States. These activities
include conventional labor activities such as ceasing to perform work or urging
that others cease to patronize or to employ any party to a dispute or urging
that others do. The Norris-LaGuardia Act [29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1976) ],
passed in 1932, contains a declaration of policy favoring freedom of employees
to organize and further limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to grant injunc-
tions in labor disputes. Because it is so directly related in purpose and effect
to Section 20 of Clayton, the practices which Norris-LaGuardia protects from
injunctions have been taken to be exempt under Section 20 from the antitrust
laws. Read together, the two statutes thus grant antitrust exemption to a
broad range of conduct of the kind traditionally engaged in by unions.
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emption for collectively bargained employment agreements in
furtherance of federal labor policy.10 Because the statutory
exemption is exclusively available to labor organizations, the
NFL could claim only the latter exemption in Mackey.
The circuit court examined the rationale behind the nonstat-
utory exemption, an accommodation of competing congres-
sional policies: one, favoring free competition, antitrust; and
the other, a strong preference for collectively bargained em-
ployment agreements. 0 s Next, it disagreed with the lower
court, and determined that since the nonstatutory exemption
is based on a national preference for collective bargaining, it
must logically be available to both parties to a labor agree-
ment.109
Having found the exemption to be potentially available to
the NFL, the circuit court assumed, without deciding, that the
Rozelle Rule was incorporated by reference into the 1970 Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement."10 At this point the court was
squarely faced with a conflict between the antitrust laws and
the national labor policy. The Rozelle Rule had a clear an-
ticompetitive impact; at the same time, federal labor policy
strongly favors collective bargaining agreements. The solution
to this dilemma required a determination of "whether the rele-
vant federal labor policy is deserving of preeminence over fed-
eral antitrust policy under the circumstances of the particular
case.""' In making this determination, the court extracted
three guiding principles common to the Supreme Court deci-
sions carving out the nonstatutory exemption."12
First the court of appeals found that if the labor policy was to
prevail the challenged restraint must primarily affect only the
parties to the collective agreement.' The decisive factor here
107. 421 U.S. at 622.
108. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 611-12.
109. Id. at 612. This proposition has generally received approval from commenta-
tors. See Note, supra note 100, 21 ST. LouIs U. L.J., at 588-89; Jacobs & Winter, supra
note 41; Lowell, supra note 40. There is also support in the case law. See Scooper
Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974).
110. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 613. The court also determined that the Rozelle
Rule was incorporated by reference in the 1968 agreement. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 613 n.11. The Eighth Circuit relied on four cases in particular: Connell
Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
113. 543 F.2d at 614.
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is apparently whether the restraint affects only the employee
or labor market, or whether it affects the product market as
well."'4 The Rozelle Rule operates as a restriction on player
movement, and the court readily concluded that it primarily af-
fected only the parties to the collective agreements.1 1 5
The second principle required that the subject of the re-
straint be within the ambit of the command of the National La-
bor Relations Act to bargain on "wages, hours, and other terms
or conditions of employment . . ." or "mandatory subjects" of
bargaining."' Here the court of appeals overruled the district
court's circular reasoning that the very fact of antitrust illegal-
ity precluded application of the labor exemption. 1 7  A
mandatory subject of bargaining cannot be deemed nonmanda-
tory for the purposes of taking it out of the labor exemption
solely because it would otherwise violate the antitrust laws."18
To so hold, concluded the court, would be to eliminate the non-
statutory exemption entirely. Because it operated to restrain
inter-team player movement, to deflate demand for player
services, and to keep wages artificially low, the Rozelle Rule
was found to be a mandatory subject of bargaining.119
Application of the labor exemption then came down to the
single issue raised by the third guiding principle, whether the
114. See Note, supra note 100, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 565 (1977), where the author ar-
gues that this first principle should be determinative of the exemption issue. "The
crucial distinction has always been the difference between restraining the employee or
product market. This distinction should be used as a means of triggering an absolute
labor exemption. Whenever the items of the collective agreement affect, and are
meant to affect, primarily only the parties to the agreement, the labor exemption
should be available. In such situations the balancing test should not be used. To do so
would place the validity of the agreement in the hands of each succeeding court." Id.
at 592.
115. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 615.
116. Id., quoting § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976).
117. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 615. See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1008. See
note 92 and accompanying text, supra.
118. In the words of Judge Lay:
In this case the district court held that, in view of the illegality of the Rozelle
Rule under the Sherman Act, it was 'a nonmandatory illegal subject of bar-
gaining.' We disagree. The labor exemption presupposes a violation of the an-
titrust laws. To hold that a subject relating to wages, hours and working
conditions becomes nonmandatory by virtue of its illegality under the anti-
trust laws obviates the labor exemption. We conclude that whether the agree-
ments here in question relate to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
should be determined solely under federal labor law.
543 F.2d at 615.
119. Id.
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Rozelle Rule was the "product of bona fide arms-length bar-
gaining."12 0 Here the court examined the district court's find-
ings and found substantial evidence to support them based on
the circuit court's independent review of the record.12 ' Be-
cause the NFLPA's comparatively weak financial position re-
sulted in a bargaining disadvantage, and because the Rozelle
Rule was unilaterally created by the league, the rule was not
the product of bona fide arms-length bargaining. 2 2 The court
specifically rejected the NFL's argument that the rule was a
quid pro quo for increased pension benefits and the right of
players to individually negotiate their salaries. 2 3 In sum, the
court found nothing in the record to warrant disturbing the dis-
trict court's findings of fact. The Rozelle Rule was never the
product of arms-length bargaining and hence, the court held,
could not fall within the protection of the nonstatutory labor
exemption to the antitrust laws.'2 4
Significantly, the circuit court explicitly encouraged the par-
ties to "resolve this question through collective bargaining."125
120. Id. In support of this principle the court quoted from Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676 (1965): "'Thus the issue in this case is whether the . . . restric-
tion . . . is so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the un-
ions' successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arms-length
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in
combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor pol-
icy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.'" 543 F.2d at 615 n.15 (emphasis
added). The NFL vigorously opposed this interpretation. "The use of the words 'bona
fide arms-length bargaining' in one passage of the opinion in Jewel Tea provides no
basis for the third immunity requirement imposed by the Court of Appeals in this
case." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 15-16, Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976). On the other hand, the quotation has been applauded with equal vigor. "It is
significant to note at this point that that the Mackey court took pains to set forth the
above quote from Justice White's opinion in order to elucidate the meaning the court
gave to the phrase 'product of bona fide arms-length bargaining.' Plainly the principle
stated by the Mackey court was meant to encompass two concepts: first, that an agree-
ment can neither be unilaterally imposed upon a union such as a company dominated
situation, or be the result of a conspiracy with employers as in Pennington; and sec-
ond, that the agreement entered into by the union be in pursuit of its own policies, i.e.,
'self interest.'" HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTo PROFES-
SIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (final Report 1977) citing
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See note 196 and accompany-
ing text, infra. To the same effect, see Lee, A Survey of Professional Team Sport-
Player-Control Mechanisms Under Antitrust and Labor Law Principles: Peace at
Last, 11 VAL. U.L. REV. 373, 415-16 (1977).
121. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 616.
122. Id. at 615-16.
123. Id. at 616.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 623.
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It also strongly suggested that any agreement reached through
good faith bargaining on the subject of compensation for inter-
team player movement would be immune from antitrust at-
tack.12 6 The case was remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with the opinion.12 7
Alexander v. NFL: Settlement of Players'
Class Action Approved
During the period between the Mackey decisions, a class ac-
tion was filed on behalf of all NFL players seeking damages
caused by the operation of the Rozelle Rule. 2 s The action,
based on section 4 of the Clayton Act,'2 9 was filed with the
same district judge, Judge Larson, who three months earlier
had decided Mackey. The class action named the same de-
fendants,' and alleged the same Sherman Act, section ls vio-
lation as in the Mackey case. In short, the Alexander and
Mackey cases have much more in common than merely bear-
ing the name of the current NFLPA president as lead plain-
tiff.132
It was not until the Eighth Circuit's Mackey decision in Octo-
ber of 1976, outlining the prerequisites of the labor exemption,
that the bargaining climate and the chances for settlement in
the class action began to show real signs of progress. 33 For
although the appellate court affirmed the NFL's antitrust liabil-
ity, it also carved out a means of implementing a system of re-
straints on player movement immune from antitrust attack.13 4
126. Id. See note 197 and accompanying text, infra.
127. 543 F.2d at 623.
128. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977), affd sub nom.
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978). As amended, the complaint described the
plaintiff class as "all professional football players who have been under contract to one
or more of the defendants at any time since September 17, 1972." Brief for Appellants
at 4, Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brieffor Appel-
lants].
129. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
130. The defendants in both instances were the NFL, all 26 member clubs (Tampa
Bay and Seattle were not in the league during the tenure of the Rozelle Rule), and
Commissioner Rozelle. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 1 61,730, at p. 72,984.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
132. John Mackey and Kermit Alexander were both NFLPA presidents. Brief for
Appellees National Football League and Twenty-Six NFL Member Clubs, at 7 n.1,
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
133. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 32.
134. The three requirements for application of the labor exemption in Mackey, 543
F.2d at 613. See notes 113-23 and accompanying text, supra.
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This gave the NFL an incentive to negotiate at arms-length
with a player's association of roughly equivalent bargaining
strength. 13 5 Mackey was the catalyst to reaching a collective
bargaining agreement, ending over three years of labor strife in
the NFL without an agreement. 1 3 6
Also germane to the Alexander settlement was the NFL's
pending petition in Mackey for certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court. The Court never directly ruled on the
petition, but it did carry the petition over to its next term upon
being informed that a settlement in Alexander was before the
district court for its approval.1 3 ' As part of the settlement
agreement, the NFL later withdrew its Mackey petition upon
final court approval of the Alexander settlement.13 8 The entire
Mackey trial transcript, some 12,000 pages in length, was incor-
porated into the Alexander record.139 As the district court
made explicit, "The Court's evaluation of the proposed settle-
ment has necessarily proceeded in the light of the Mackey trial
and the decisions and further developments in that case."140
The plaintiff class was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b) (1)141
and consisted of all football players under contract with NFL
teams between September 17, 1972142 and March 1, 1977. On the
135. As Dan Rooney, President of the Pittsburgh Steelers, testified, "I think we
have to have a collective bargaining agreement with the Players Association in order to
have a system [of player restraints]. I think that is what the Eighth Circuit Court and
everyone else has said to us . . . you have to have someone bargaining for the players
collectively and that is what gives us the insulation for being able to have a system."
Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 33-34.
136. The previous collective bargaining agreement expired on Jan. 31, 1974 and the
current agreement was reached on March 1, 1977. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128,
at 27 n.47.
137. Brief for Appellees, National Football League and Twenty-Six NFL Member
Clubs, at 8-9, Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
138. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases [ 61,730, at p. 72,992 (D. Minn. 1977).
139. Id. at 72,986.
140. Id.
141. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)1:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompati-
ble standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests.
142. This date corresponds to the applicable three and one half year statute of limi-
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latter date the NFLPA entered into a new Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement with the NFL Management Council (NFLMC),
the NFL member clubs' collective bargaining representative.4 a
Simultaneously, a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was
reached by the parties in the Alexander class action.1" The
district court also determined that all the class action prerequi-
sites1 4 5 were present and that proper notice had been given
before certification.14 6
Under the Settlement Agreement the NFL agreed to pay the
plaintiff class $13,675,000.m4 This sum was to be divided among
the plaintiff class according to a "point" allocation system,
under which varying amounts of points were allotted for each
year played depending on whether the player was a veteran or
a rookie, on whether or not he had played out his option, and
the relative strength of the rival World Football League in the
year the option was played out. 48  The settlement fund was
first divided by the total number of points outstanding, then
tations period; suit was filed on March 16, 1976. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at
2 n.6.
143. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, Preamble.
144. Although the class action was NFLPA-sponsored, and the class counsel, Ed
Glennon, also was the NFLPA antitrust counsel, the plaintiff class represented the in-
terests of all affected NFL players, whether NFLPA members or not. This is the basis
for a conflict of interest argument raised on appeal. See note 173 and accompanying
text, infra.
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requires: "One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class." The district court found the class, totaling
about 5700, to have the requisite numerosity, that the claims of each class member
involved common issues because the NFL had "acted on grounds generally applicable
in substantially identical manner to all players in the NFL," that the claims of the 78
named plaintiffs were typical of the class, and that class interests were fairly and ade-
quately represented. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730, at pp. 72,989-90 (D.
Minn. 1977).
146. Id. at 72,986-89.
147. Id. at 72,992.
148. Specifically, each veteran player received one point for each season in question
(1972-75) in which he received pension-vested credit, e.g., played in three or more
games. Draftees were given %th of a point if they were drafted in 1973, 1/16th for the
1974 and 1975 seasons, and 1/4th for the 1976 draft. Players who played out their options
were awarded points as follows: for 1973 and 1977 free agents one point per year; for
the 1974 and 1976 free agents, no points; and 1975 free agents % a point. Because the
rival World Football League did sign some NFL players and draftees in 1974 and 1975,
the points allotted to these years were correspondingly reduced in the belief that the
presence of a viable WFL minimized restrictive impact of the Rozelle Rule. The rule
was not in effect during the 1976 season. In addition, all named plaintiffs received one
420 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
each player was to receive compensation in the amount of the
number of points earned multiplied by the value of a single
point.'4 9 In return the plaintiff class and the NFLPA agreed not
to sue with respect to the "NFL rules as they existed and will
exist from the 1972 season through and including the duration
of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement."5 0 In turn,
the NFL agreed to withdraw its petition for certiorari.
After reviewing the settlement provisions in light of both the
uncertainties of litigation' and of the general desirability of
settlement, the court gave its approval.5 2 It found the settle-
ment to be "fair, reasonable, and adequate."' Additionally, it
refused a plaintiff class request to "retain jurisdiction over the
Collective Bargaining Agreement" to watch over the operation
of the new Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rule. 54  The
court felt that when such disputes arose, they could be re-
solved in other forums. 55
Reynolds v. NFL :156 Objections to the Class
Action Settlement
After the district court's approval of the Stipulation and Set-
tlement Agreement, 16 members of the plaintiff class, all of
point. However, the Mackey plaintiffs were not awarded points, for they were compen-
sated from a separate $2,200,000 fund specifically set aside for them. Id.
149. Judge Larson determined that 5,738.6 points were outstanding, and that each
point was worth $2,382.99. Id. at 73,008.
150. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded on appeal: "We are satisfied that the Cove-
nant Not to Sue is superfluous insofar as the matters properly before the District Court
in this class action are concerned." Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 288.
151. The court identified three reasons for this uncertainty. First, the issue of liabil-
ity had not been ultimately decided because the NFL's petition for certiorari was still
pending. Second, in order to recover the treble damage award the plaintiffs would
have to establish (1) an antitrust violation, (2) an injury to their business or property,
and (3) a direct causal link between the two. Finally, the restrictiveness of the succes-
sor to the Rozelle Rule was also unknown. See notes 259-273 and accompanying text,
infra. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730, at p. 72,994 (D. Minn. 1977).
152. Id. at 73,004.
153. Id. at 72,992-93. The "fair, reasonable, and adequate" standard was taken from
Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114,123 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
423 U.S. 864 (1975).
154. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases $ 61,730, at pp. 73-008-09 (D. Minn. 1977).
This decision was appealed by the plaintiff class. See notes 189-93 and accompanying
text, infra. The Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rule, Collective Bargaining
Agreement, supra note 4, art. XV [hereinafter referred to as the First Refusal Rule].
155. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730, at p. 73,009 (D. Minn. 1977).
156. 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978), affg Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,730
(D. Minn. 1977).
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whom had previously objected to the terms of the proposed
settlement, appealed.17 Appellants were dissatisfied with the
settlement in two respects. As above-average players, they be-
lieved their interests were not adequately represented by a
plaintiff class consisting of all NFL players and sponsored by
the player's union, the NFLPA.15 1 Secondly, appellants con-
tended that the new First Refusal Rule15 1 was more onerous
than its predecessor, the Rozelle Rule.'
The plaintiff class joined the NFL as appellees and settle-
ment-proponents. However, the plaintiff class, although not
desiring disturbance of the settlement approval, did become
concerned over the operation of the First Refusal Rule,' and
requested that the district court be instructed to retain juris-
diction over the implementation of the new rule.162 The NFL
completed this somewhat unusual procedural alignment by
steadfastly arguing in favor of the settlement, including the
fairness of the $13 million damage figure it was obligated to
pay.163
The objector-appellants initially attacked the Rule 23(b) (1)
157. The objector-appellants consist of one inactive, and 15 active NFL players.
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F. Supp. at 280, 281. The appellants are: (1) Marvin Crenshaw, an
inactive player concerned primarily with the Covenant Not to Sue; (2) Jack Reynolds,
an above-average active player not represented by Howard Slusher; and (3) Charles
Young, et al. (Adams, Barzilauskas, Carr, Clack, Cobb, Dutton, Fouts, Kunz, Mullins,
Stallworth, Stokes, Swann, and White), all active players employing the same agent,
Howard Slusher. Brief for Appellees National Football League and Twenty-Six NFL
Member Clubs, at 12, Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978); Brief for Appellants,
supra note 128, at 23 n.43. Reynolds appears as the lead appellant because he was the
first to file a notice of appeal. Id. at 23. Howard Slusher characterizes the owner-
player relationship as similar to that of father and son. The owners like their players
but have no respect for them. He currently represents about fifty players in their
struggle to gain respect. One tactic he advocates is "withholding services." Referring
to team owners, he continues, "the people who have the most to lose are the people
with the long-term vested interests. And believe me they're bright enough to protect
those interests. . . . They traditionally solve problems by passing rules. When R.C.
Owens left San Francisco to play for Baltimore, they passed the Rozelle Rule. Now
they'll figure out more rules to keep themselves in control." Goodman, The Man Gen-
eral Managers Hate, S.F. Chronicle, May 10, 1978, at 56, col. 6.
158. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 51-68.
159. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, art. XV.
160. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 80.
161. Concern turned into strong dissatisfaction on the part of the NFLPA, and there
was some talk of a player strike before the 1979 season. S.F. Examiner, Feb. 16, 1979, at
57, col. 4.
162. The plaintiff class filed a motion for remand of the case or a stay of the appeal
proceedings. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 288-89. The circuit court denied it. See notes
189-93 and accompanying text, infra.
163. The amount of the damage award, $13,675,000 to the plaintiff class and $2,200,000
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class action certification."' They first contended that the com-
plaint sought only antitrust damages and that individual ac-
tions would not pose a possibility of inconsistent or
incompatible standards of conduct as required under Rule
23(b) (1) 1 because the Mackey case had disposed of the liabil-
ity issue."'6 Therefore, they proposed the proper class action
form should have been Rule 23(b) (3).167 However, Chief Cir-
cuit Judge Gibson disregarded the form of the complaint, and
found the substance of the antitrust class action to be broadly
based.' Only after the Collective Bargaining Agreement was
reached did the need for injunctive relief dissolve.16 9 Such re-
lief was specifically sought in the original complaint.170 An an-
titrust attack on the NFL's rules and practices governing
player allocation, Judge Gibson concluded, "plainly encom-
passed the possibility that separate actions could set incom-
patible standards of conduct [and] might be dispositive of the
interests of class members not parties to the actions ....
The requirements of a Rule 23(b) (1) class action were thus
satisfied. However, common questions of law and fact ap-
peared to predominate over individual ones, 1 72 and certification
under Rule 23(b) (3) was also possible.7 a In such a situation,
to the Mackey plaintiffs, was not seriously contested on appeal. See Brief for Appel-
lants, supra note 128, at 45-92.
164. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 283. A thorough review of the class action issues is
beyond the scope of this Note. Although appellants strenuously argued that deficien-
cies in the class action warranted a reversal, it is believed their chief object was to
challenge the new player restraint, the First Refusal Rule. In the words of Chief Judge
Gibson, "Appellant-objectors' primary complaint relates to Article XV of the collective
bargaining agreement. . . ." Id. at 286-87. Hence the discussion here will merely sum-
marize the class action issues.
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
166. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 46.
167. In addition to the traditional class action prerequisites, Rule 23(b) (3) requires
that: "the court [find] that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adju-
dication of the controversy." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3). See note 145, supra.
168. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 283.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 284.
171. Id.
172. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 284.
173. Appellants also argued that there were distinct and disparate groups within
the plaintiff class representing antagonistic interests and warranting subclassification
as allowed under Rule 23(c) (4) (B). Additionally, they alleged a conflict between the
NFLPA's duty of fair representation of the majority interests of the bargaining unit
and the fiduciary duty owed by the class representatives to all class members. Brief
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presenting a choice between 23(b) (1) and 23(b) (3) certifica-
tion, the court found that normally the former is preferable.
Under Rule 23(b) (3) class members may "opt out"174 resulting
in the possibility that subsequent individual actions may be in-
consistent with the class action determination.175 Judge Gib-
son also determined that proper notice of the settlement was
given.17  Applying the judicial standard of review in class ac-
tions,17 7 the court of appeals, according to the trial judge's
views wide latitude, held that there was no abuse of discretion
and affirmed the 23(b) (1) certification.17
In the evaluation of the terms of the settlement, the trial
judge is afforded similar deference.17 9 The issue on appeal was
whether the district court committed a clear abuse of discre-
tion in finding the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate.8 0  Appellants' principal contention was that the new
First Refusal Rule was even more restrictive, because of its
For Appellants, supra note 128, at 52, 55. The circuit court's response to both of the
arguments was that the collective bargaining agreement was before Judge Larson
"only to the extent necessary to determine whether the compromise [the settlement]
should be approved. . . ." Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 284. The court of appeals found
no evidence to support the conflict of interest charges and agreed with the district
court that "theoretical conflicts of interest did not require subclassification, disqualifi-
cation of the named parties and class counsel, or disapproval of the settlement." Id. at
286. See notes 256-61 and accompanying text, infra.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) contains the so-called 'book of the month club' provi-
sion: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall . . .
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so re-
quests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion . . . ." Because individual class members may
choose to pursue individual actions, the possibility of adjudications inconsistent with
the class action determination arises.
175. The court cited 3B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 23.31[3] (1977), 7A C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1772 at 7 (1972), and numerous cases.
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 284.
176. "Appellants' argument contesting the adequacy of the notice given to the class
members fails because it is premised upon this same misconception regarding the
scope of the settlement approval. The District Court having properly determined that
this case was maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b) (1), the only notice to the
class thereafter required was one of any proposed dismissal or compromise." Id. at
285.
177. Judge Gibson, quoting an earlier Eighth Circuit opinion, Grunin v. Interna-
tional House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 864 (1975),
declared: "Only upon the clear showing that the district court abused its discretion
will this court intervene to set aside a judicially approved class action settlement." Id.
at 283.
178. Id. at 284-85.
179. Id. at 283-84.
180. Id. at 283, 287.
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perpetual duration, than its predecessor, the Rozelle Rule.18'
The court of appeals found the record supported the contrary
conclusion, because 168 players had played out their options
under the new rule in two years, while only 176 had done so
during the Rozelle Rule's eleven year existence.18 2 He dis-
missed the idea of unrestricted player movement, apparently
advocated by the appellants, 83 as ignoring the league structure
and concluded that some rules restricting player movement
are essential to league survival.18 4
It is important to remember that this consideration of a pro-
vision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement 8 5 was confined
to its "bearing on the fairness of the settlement and the advisa-
bility of injunctive relief.""' In this context the settlement was
viewed as "fair, reasonable and substantial""' and the district
court's approval was affirmed.18 8
Finally, the court turned to the plaintiff class's motion for re-
mand or for a stay of the appeal, with instruction that the dis-
trict court retain jurisdiction over the Collective Bargaining
Agreement for the purposes of monitoring the First Refusal
Rule." The plaintiff class advocated this measure in order to
ensure that the class received the rights secured by the settle-
ment. But, unlike the objector-appellants, the plaintiff class
was careful to spell out that the new rule, even without the re-
181. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at El. See note 164, supra.
182. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 287. The court's argument here is superficial at
best. The number of players playing out their options (becoming free agents) in a
given year is not an indication of restrictiveness. The number of free agents actually
able to switch teams is the determinative factor in judging freedom of player move-
ment.
183. Appellants did offer some alternative mechanisms to regulate inter-team
player movement. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at E8-E9.
184. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 287.
185. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, art. XV.
186. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 288.
187. Id. at 287.
188. Id. at 289.
189. Id. at 288-89. See Brief of Appellees Kermit Alexander, et al. (Plaintiff Class),
46-49, Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978). The district judge in the basketball
player class action, involving similar procedural issues, followed such a practice. Rob-
ertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
Judge Robert Carter retained jurisdiction over any disputes arising under the bas-
ketball collective bargaining agreement. Two years later he exercised this jurisdiction
and overruled a compensation award rendered by NBA Commissioner Larry O'Brien.
After the New York Knicks signed free agent Marvin Webster from the Seattle Super-
sonics, O'Brien ordered the Knicks to give up Lonnie Shelton, a 1979 first-round draft
choice, and $450,000. Judge Carter ruled this to be excessive compensation. S.F.
Chronicle, Sept. 20, 1979, at 63, col. 6.
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quested monitoring safeguard, provided enough procedural
improvements over the Rozelle Rule to "pass muster under the
antitrust laws.""'o Appellants, of course, maintained that the
refusal to have a full inquiry into the collective bargaining
process warranted reversal of the settlement approval as well
as the requested remand.1 9 ' The NFL, on the other hand, con-
tended that the Collective Bargaining Agreement was arrived
at through arms-length bargaining, and that questions of inter-
pretation and implementation of the new rule were merely
union grievances and should be resolved through the machin-
ery set out in the agreement. 9 2 Without deciding whether the
correct procedure had been followed by the plaintiff class in
making the motion, the court agreed with the NFL that the is-
sue should be resolved through "normal channels of labor dis-
pute resolution," and denied the motion.19 3
The court concluded by admonishing the parties to resolve
future disputes through collective bargaining. It reasoned that
when rules restraining player movement have been arrived at
through arms-length bargaining, as appeared to be the case,
they fall within the labor exemption to antitrust attack "and
the merits of the bargaining agreement are not an issue for
court determination."19 4 This statement, taken in combination
with his earlier remark that the Covenant Not to Sue was "su-
perfluous,"195 can leave little doubt that, at least in the Eighth
Circuit, the First Refusal Rule is immune from antitrust attack.
190. Brief of Appellees Kermit Alexander, et al. (Plaintiff Class) at 49, Reynolds v.
NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
It should be noted that desirable as class counsel believe the district court's
retention of jurisdiction to be for the above specified reasons, class counsel do
not share Objectors' apparent view that such a measure is essential in order
for the new option compensation rule to comply with the criteria for a rule
governing player movement that would be acceptable under the antitrust
laws, which this Court delineated in the Mackey case.
Id. (emphasis in the original). The NFLPA no longer believes in the antitrust validity
of the First Refusal Rule. See notes 237-39 and accompanying text, infra.
191. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 93.
192. Opposition of Appellees National Football League and NFL Member Clubs to
Motion of Appellee Plaintiff Class for Remand, or Alternatively, for a Stay at 2-3, 6,
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1977).
193. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 289.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 288.
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Reynolds: Analysis of What Was Stated and
What Was Not
In order to understand fully the implications of Reynolds, it
must be remembered that the Eighth Circuit also rendered the
Mackey decision. Reynolds presented an opportunity for the
court to reiterate the standards enunciated in Mackey, making
plain its belief that the collective bargaining process was the
proper vehicle for player-management dispute resolution. 1 9 6
Obliged to apply the antitrust laws in Mackey because of the
absence of genuine arms-length bargaining, the Reynolds court
was able to avoid any consideration of the antitrust validity of
the new First Refusal Rule. Additionally, Reynolds allowed
the court to announce, albeit in dicta, that the new rule was
almost certain to fall under the protection of the labor exemp-
tion.97 The significance of Reynolds lies not so much in what
was articulated, but rather in what was not: the court's unspo-
ken impatience with litigious athletes and the underlying sen-
timent that judicial restraint is now the appropriate posture in
resolving professional team sport controversies.
Judicial Restraint
The Mackey case was initially hailed as a great victory for
players' freedom."' Its real significance, however, lies in the
labor exemption. The NFLPA, after having achieved its long-
awaited freedom, bargained it away for greater financial re-
ward under perhaps an even more restrictive player restraint
rule.199 The Rozelle Rule was a violation of the antitrust laws
not because the players then had a less desirable minimum
salary provision in the collective bargaining agreement to off-
set it, but because the rule artificially prevented the players
196. "We encourage the parties to resolve this question through collective bargain-
ing. The parties are far better suited to agreeably resolve what rules governing player
transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than are the courts." Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d at 623. "We emphasize today as we did in Mackey, supra, that the sub-
ject of player movement restrictions is a proper one for resolution in the collective
bargaining context." Reynolds v. NFL, 580 F.2d at 289.
197. "Although we need not decide the question, it appears to be a near certainty
that the collective bargaining agreement was the result of 'bona fide arms-length nego-
tiations.'" Id. at 288. "[WIhen so resolved, as it appears to have been in the current
collective bargaining agreement, the labor exemption to antitrust attack applies, and
the merits of the [collective I bargaining agreement are not an issue for court determi-
nation." Id. at 289. See note 218, infra.
198. See note 95 and accompanying text, supra.
199. See notes 227-38 and accompanying text, infra.
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from receiving the value of their services in an open market.200
The First Refusal Rule, on the other hand, was created through
bargaining. Undeniably it has helped to raise salaries, 201 and,
at least in theory,2 0 2 the rule appears generally beneficial to
player interests. Nonetheless, antitrust scrutiny would proba-
bly render the rule invalid.203 The solution to this dilemma lies
in the Mackey labor exemption.
Where collective agreement has been reached on a
mandatory subject through arms-length bargaining, and the re-
sulting provision primarily affects only the parties to the agree-
ment, it is immune from antitrust attack.2 04 No one is in a
better position to appreciate the unique needs of professional
football than its participants and team owners. The "bona fide
arms-length bargaining" requirement has been criticized as an
unwarranted judicial intrusion into the bargaining process. 205
But, as the Mackey case illustrated, the mere fact that a provi-
sion has been incorporated into a collective agreement does
not ensure that it was the product of good faith bargaining.2 06
During the most recent negotiations, proceeding in the after-
math of Mackey and its labor exemption, the NFL recognized
the need to establish the NFLPA's bargaining strength in order
to produce bona fide arms-length bargaining.207 The Mackey
labor exemption encourages at least the appearance of good
faith bargaining and allows the courts to avoid areas of player-
owner controversy not suited for judicial interference.0
200. In general the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, not competi-
tors. Their goal is economic efficiency. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940).
201. Under the rule's first full year of operation in 1978, the average salary in the
NFL rose 13.2% to $62,585. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1979, at 55, col. 4.
202. The "right" of first refusal becomes necessary only when a player has received
an offer from another team. Without an offer the First Refusal Rule never comes into
play. Presently it appears that the NFLPA believes that owners are not exercising
good faith in this regard. See note 223 and accompanying text, infra.
203. See notes 215-19 and accompanying text, infra.
204. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 613-16.
205. See Note, supra note 76, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. at 592. See note 114, supra. The
argument is essentially that subjective judicial notions of fairness should not be al-
lowed to upset the delicate balance achieved through collective bargaining.
206. 543 F.2d at 616.
207. In the current agreement the parties explicitly declare "that this agreement is
the product of bona fide, arms-length collective bargaining." Collective Bargaining
Agreement, supra note 4, Preamble (emphasis added). This is a verbatim repetition of
Mackey's third requirement.
208. The league structure produces unique problems best resolved through collec-
tive bargaining. But this is not to say judicial restraint in all aspects of sports is always
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Interestingly, after the Reynolds decision came down, the
plaintiff class returned to District Judge Larson and made a
Rule 60(b) motion2 0 9 for relief from judgment alleging, inter
alia, that newly-discovered evidence warranted reopening his
decision to approve the settlement. The plaintiffs further al-
leged that the NFL owners had committed a "fraud on the
court" 2 10 through their failure to disclose their interpretation of
the First Refusal Rule under which they could exercise their
right of first refusal on the same player year after year. This
second allegation, if established, could have removed the rule
from the protection of the labor exemption,2 1' since if fraud
were proved, the owners would not have been bargaining in
good faith.
Judge Larson restated that the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment was not part of the settlement,2 1 2 and denied the motion
without addressing its merits.2 13 Significantly, the objector-ap-
pellant (Reynolds et al.) did not join the plaintiff class, even
though the class as a whole now seemed to share a dislike for
the restrictive operation of the new rule.2 14
desirable; the courts must continue to entertain actions in contract, tort, and other
areas of traditional judicial expertise.
209. FED. R. CIv. P. 60 reads in relevant part:
(b) Mistakes: Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evi-
dence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud . .. ; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. . . ."
210. LAWDIBLE, Nov. 1978, at 4, col. 3.
211. Nevertheless, the NFLPA and the plaintiff class have agreed to the Covenant
Not to Sue in the Alexander settlement. Therefore any suit against the First Refusal
Rule would be frustrated in advance unless this covenant or the entire settlement
were to be invalidated.
212. See Memorandum Order, at 2, Alexander v. NFL (No. 4-76-Civil 123) (D. Minn.
Nov. 10, 1978).
213. Id.
214. LAWDIBLE, Nov. 1978, at 4. The NFLPA states:
Perhaps the greatest irony in the whole Alexander-Reynolds scenario is that
the Tochman [sic] and Slusher group failed to support the union's effort to
preserve Larsen's [sic] jurisdiction over the new system. They took jurisdic-
tion from Larsen [sic] in the first place by appealing the class action settle-
ment, and, refused, during the appeal, to join in the union's efforts to have the
case sent back to [sic]. Instead, they took an 'all or nothing' approach and
said that the entire bargaining agreement should be thrown out. The result
now is a Circuit Court decision unfavorable to all but the NFL owners, and no
way to go other than arbitration or the Supreme Court.
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The players are now saddled with a rule which they feel is
both unfair and illegal under the antitrust laws. 2 15 They have
exhausted the available avenues of legal recourse, and can
only pursue their grievance through arbitration,2 1 6 since Mack-
ey's labor exemption precluded evaluation of their antitrust
challenge on its merits. To understand the application of the
labor exemption to the instant case, and to collectively bar-
gained agreements in professional sports in general, an assess-
ment of the First Refusal Rule is necessary. Specifically, an
antitrust evaluation of the rule is warranted.
Although Judge Gibson in Reynolds stated, in dicta, that the
First Refusal Rule was almost certainly the product of arms-
length bargaining,2 1 7 this should not end the inquiry.218 The
nonstatutory exemption, being a compromise between conflict-
ing federal antitrust and labor policies, necessarily entails
some balancing. Although unlikely, the First Refusal Rule may
not be immune from antitrust attack if, on balance, the anti-
trust goals outweigh the federal preference for collective bar-
gaining. Admittedly, by meeting all three of the Mackey
prerequisites, the rule does represent very important labor in-
terest; nevertheless, the antitrust aspects should still be evalu-
ated. Ultimately, since the competing policies must be
weighed, the determination must be on a case by case basis.2 1 9
Objector-appellants' counsel, Gerold Tockman, admitted to being torn between sup-
porting the Rule 60(b) motion and pursuing the interests of his clients through more
direct measures. Interview with Gerold Tockman, Nov. 15, 1978.
215. Memorandum Order, at 2, Alexander v. NFL (No. 4-76-Civil 123) (D. Minn. Nov.
10, 1978): "Essentially, class counsel wants to argue that the interpretation of the first
refusal/player compensation rule violates Mackey and therefore the antitrust laws."
216. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, art. II, § 2 allows submission of
claims of lack of good faith negotiations to an outside arbitrator. The threatened
player strike would have been in violation of the "No Strike/Lockout" provision (Art.
III). See note 224, infra.
217. Reynolds v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 289.
218. Reynolds does seem to imply that the First Refusal Rule, if the product of
arms-length bargaining, would automatically be immune. However, in the earlier
Mackey decision, the same Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals carved out the boundaries
of the labor exemption in the context of professional sports and emphasized that the
three factors were merely "guiding principles" to facilitate its determination of the
proper balance between the competing federal antitrust and labor policies. And the
Supreme Court in Connell Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975) made it plain that application of the nonstatutory exemption requires judical
balancing. For a more in-depth discussion of whether the First Refusal Rule should
receive protection under the labor exemption see Roberts & Powers, supra note 10, at
464-67.
219. See text accompanying note 111, supra.
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Evaluation of the First Refusal Rule
Between the time of the class action settlement agreement,
March 1, 1977, and the Reynolds appeal, submitted May 16,
1978, the NFLPA had the opportunity to assess the operation of
the new rule governing free agent movement. It did not like
what it saw. Only six of more than 120 free agents received
offers from other clubs.2 20 It was for this reason that the plain-
tiff class made its motion for remand or, alternatively, a stay of
the appeal. The NFLPA and the plaintiff class strongly dis-
agreed with the owners' interpretation of the First Refusal
Rule. The Eighth Circuit ruled that this disagreement over
contract interpretation did not constitute newly discovered evi-
dence,2 2 1 and denied the motion.2 22 In the winter of 1979, the
NFLPA was faced with an even more disappointing free agent
market; at last count none of the 104 eligible free agents had
received offers. 2 23 The NFLPA contemplated resort to its last
recourse, the strike.2 24
In the Reynolds opinion, only a cursory analysis of the First
Refusal Rule was undertaken.2 2 5 Writing for the court, Judge
Gibson pointed to the fact that more players had played out
their options under the new rule, and opined that some form of
restraint governing player movement appeared necessary.2 6 A
player does not gain his freedom playing out his option and
becoming a free agent. Another NFL club must make an em-
ployment offer before a player may change teams. Therefore,
the number of offers made to free agents, rather than the
number of free agents, is the more valid indicator of freedom of
movement.
The operation of the First Refusal Rule is more complex than
that of its predecessor. In essence, the rule guarantees that all
220. Miller, supra note 60, at 45, col. 1.
221. "The only 'new evidence' or 'change in circumstance' is that the National Foot-
ball League and its member clubs have interpreted the collective bargaining agree-
ment in a manner different from that of the Players Association." Reynolds v. NFL, 584
F.2d at 288.
222. Id. at 289.
223. S.F. Examiner, Feb. 16, 1979, at 57, col. 4.
224. Id. Unlike the 1974 strike, this strike would have been specifically designed to
shut down the regular season. Id. See note 69 and accompanying text, supra. Ed Gar-
vey commented, "If you shut down the season for one game it would cost [the owners]
in the neighborhood of $15 million." Id.
225. Again it must be emphasized that the First Refusal Rule was not before the
court, except to the limited extent that it affected the reasonableness of the settlement.
226. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 287.
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league players receive either the minimum salary,2 27 or the
best monetary offer'2 2 8 that any team is willing to make. Dur-
ing a specified period,2 2 9 free agents are allowed to negotiate
with all interested NFL teams. When the player has selected
the most desirable offer, the "principal terms" 230 are recorded
on an official "offer sheet"23 1 which is then filed with the league
and the player's old club. Within seven days the old club must
exercise its right of first refusal by matching the terms of the
"offer sheet" in a new contract with the player, or it must let
him transfer to the new club.
In the latter event the old club will receive a predetermined
draft choice (or choices) as compensation.2 3 3 While the new
rule is still supported by the same NFL reserve system devices,
there is a significant change. Players with four or more years
of experience no longer are required to have an option clause
227. Minimum salaries are as follows:
1979 1980
second year players $24,000 $26,000
third year players 26,000 28,000
fourth year players 28,000 30,000
fifth year players 30,000 32,000
NFLPA MEMBERSHIP GUIDE '78/79 at 15.
228. Only "principal terms" are recorded in the offer sheet. These consist of (a)
salary, (b) signing or reporting bonuses, and (c) any changes in the NFL player con-
tract form. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, art. XV, § 7.
229. February 1 to April 15. Id. §§ 2-3.
230. Id. § 7.
231. Id. § 6. Only one offer sheet may be outstanding on a player at a time. Id.
232. Id. § 5. In order to exercise its right a club must be eligible to do so. Eligibility
is achieved when the player in question has been given either a "qualifying offer" by
his old club by February 1, or an offer from another club (recorded on an offer sheet)
by the April 15 deadline in at least the following amounts:
1979 1980
Players with less than 4 years
of league experience: $30,000 $35,000
Players with less than 5 years: 40,000 40,000
Players with less than 6 years: 45,000 45,000
And increased by $5,000 for each additional year of league service. Id. § 10.
233. The amount of compensation is determined by the player's new salary as
stated in the offer sheet. If the new salary is between: $50,000 and $64,999, the compen-
sation is a 3rd-round choice; $65,000 and $74,999, the compensation is a 2nd-round
choice; $75,000 and $124,999, the compensation is a 1st-round choice; $125,000 and
$200,000, the compensation is a 1st and 2nd choice; more than $200,000, the compensa-
tion is two 1st choices. All the salary categories will increase in the 1980 season. Id.
§ 12.
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in their contract.234 There is also an "extreme personal hard-
ship" provision2 3 5 which enables a player to submit a non-in-
jury grievance that could result in a denial of his old team's
right of first refusal.236
This last provision appears to be the only way a team can be
forced to let a player go. That is, a team may choose to exer-
cise its right of first refusal every time a player becomes a free
agent and submits an "offer sheet." The NFLPA particularly
objects to this perpetual aspect of the rule. It apparently in-
terprets the rule to mean that a club can exercise it against
each player only once. 2 3 8  However, this disagreement is
234. Id. art. XIV. The new agreement also provides for a minimum salary of 110
percent (instead of 90%) of the player's contract salary, during the option year.
The NFLPA has initiated an arbitration proceeding challenging the owner's asserted
right to renew a player's contract at 110% of the salary provided in the contract in each
of two or more consecutive years. At issue is the interpretation of art. XV, § 17, which
reads in pertinent part:
Re-Signing: If a veteran free agent receives no offer to sign a contract or
contracts with a new NFL club pursuant to this Article, and his old club ad-
vises him in writing by June 1 that it desires to re-sign him, the player may, at
his option within 15 days, sign either (a) a contract or contracts with his old
club at its last best written offer given on or before February 1 of that year, or
(b) a one-year contract (with no option year) with his old club at 110% of the
salary provided in his contract for the last preceding year (if the player has
just played out the option year, the rate will be 120%).
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, art. XV, § 17.
The arbitration involved John Dutton, formerly with the Baltimore Colts, now with
the Dallas Cowboys. Baltimore advised Dutton of its desire to re-sign before June 1 in
both 1978 and 1979. Dutton selected option (b) and signed a one year contract for 1978-
1979 but refused to do so again for 1979-1980. It should be noted that Dutton was given
the requisite qualifying offer of the applicable minimum salary by the Colts each year.
If the qualifying offer had not been made Dutton would have become a free agent on
February 1.
Dutton and the NFLPA contended that a club cannot give notice of its desire to re-
sign on more than one occasion. Otherwise, they argued, the option clause would be
meaningless and a club could indefinitely bind its players in this manner. The NFL, on
the other hand, contended that the language clearly gives member clubs that right.
Arbitrator Bert Luskin was expected to render his decision by the end of 1979. Tele-
phone conversation with NFLPA staff attorney, Aug. 24, 1979.
However, the arbitration decision was never rendered because Dutton was traded to
the Dallas Cowboys where he finished the 1979 season. S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 10, 1979, at
65, col. 3.
235. "'Personal hardship' is not defined, but it would include situations where the
player alleged discrimination, or needs to be in a certain geographical area for valid
personal reasons." NFLPA MEMBERSHIP GUIDE '78/79, at 31.
236. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, art. XV, § 8.
237. Class counsel alleged that there was a "secret agreement" by the NFL owners
to interpret article XV as a "perpetual option" in support of their Rule 60(b) motion
before Judge Larson. See LAWDIBLE, Nov. 1968, at 4.
238. Interview with Gerold Tockman, Nov. 15, 1978.
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dwarfed by the present controversy surrounding the sparse
number of offers made to free agents. The NFLPA realizes that
good faith offers are essential to the contemplated operation of
the First Refusal Rule.
From an antitrust viewpoint it may be argued that the new
rule has the desirable effect of forcing player salaries closer to
the free market level. It is true that the players, the class dam-
aged by the Rozelle Rule, are ensured of receiving more money
under the First Refusal Rule. However, the new rule contains
the same anticompetitive devices which were held to violate
the antitrust laws in Mackey.239
It has been established that because of the business pecu-
liarities of professional sports, the per se rule of antitrust liabil-
ity should not be applied.24 0 Analysis may proceed under the
Rule of Reason,2 4 1 which involves a balancing of the legitimate
business purposes that are beneficial to competition, i.e.,
procompetitive, and are promoted by the particular restraint
against the anticompetitive effects of such restraint.2 4 2 As was
outlined earlier, it is unclear whether any of the proffered justi-
fications for player restraints are actually promoted by employ-
ment of the restraints.2 4 3 Here an important distinction must
239. The Rozelle Rule was found unduly restrictive in three respects: (1) its appli-
cation to all players; (2) its unlimited, perpetual duration; and (3) its complete lack of
procedural safeguards. The First Refusal Rule has made some improvements. It only
applies to players who have received offers at certain minimum salary levels and it
provides some procedural safeguards, e.g., the "personal hardship" provision and the
removal of the Commissioner's discretionary power. However, the new rule is totally
unlimited in its scope and duration. Specifically, while the Rozelle Rule was imple-
mented infrequently (when the teams could not reach a compromise on their own),
and only after a player had changed teams, the First Refusal Rule may be used as
many times as desired to block player transfers before the fact. The Rozelle Rule ac-
ted as a strong discouragement to player movement, but it could not stop all player
transfers. Under the new rule, an owner can ensure his exclusive rights to a player's
services for as long as he pleases. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at E1-E8.
240. "The courts have consistently refused to invoke the boycott per se rule where,
given the peculiar characteristics of an industry, the need for cooperation among par-
ticipants necessitated some type of concerted refusal to deal, or where the concerted
activity manifested no purpose to exclude and in fact worked no exclusion of competi-
tors." Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (footnotes omit-
ted).
241. Id. at 1182.
242. If, on analysis, the restraint is found to have legitimate business purposes
whose realization serves to promote competition, the 'anticompetitive evils' of the
challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its 'procompetitive virtues' to
ascertain whether the former outweigh the latter." Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d
at 1183.
243. See notes 19-32 and accompanying text, supra.
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be made. The procompetitive effects to be balanced do not in-
clude any alleged promotion of competition on the playing
field. The antitrust laws are only concerned with competition
in the economic sense.2 4 Although, theoretically, players will
244. The [NFL player] draft is allegedly 'procompetitive' in its effect on the
playing field; but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing
field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition and thus im-
prove the entertainment product offered to the public, does not increase com-
petition in the economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and
to offer the product at a lower cost. . . . In strict economic terms, the draft's
demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil.
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1186. For an in-depth analysis of the NFL and
the history of the player draft, see id. at 1191-1222 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
The broader question of whether the NFL teams are competitors in the economic
sense is not without some controversy. The league has often been characterized as a
joint venture. Although this is not technically correct because the teams do not com-
pletely share their revenues, the analogy is appropriate to highlight the cooperation
necessary between member clubs. Placing themselves under the joint venture label,
however, does not automatically immunize the NFL from potential antitrust liability.
As the court made plain in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154,
164 (C.D. Cal. 1979):
Furthermore, even if the court accepts the contention that the NFL teams
are joint venturers, this does not necessarily mean that they are not economic
competitors for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the defendant companies attempted
to justify the challenged restraints of trade by characterizing their operations
as a joint venture. The Supreme Court rejected this argument:
Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition
that agreements between legally separate persons and companies to
suppress competition among themselves and others can be justified
by labeling the project a "joint venture." Perhaps every agreement
and combination to restrain trade could be so labeled.
Id. at 598. Since the NFL teams are legally separate companies, the Supreme
Court's reasoning would arguably apply to this case.
The court concludes that competition for players and, depending on a team's
location, competition for fans, indicate that the NFL teams are economic com-
petitors, though not in the traditional sense.
Professional sports leagues have also been characterized as natural monopolies, in-
dustries or markets which reach their optimum level of economic efficiency when com-
prised of only a single firm. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1195. However, even
assuming this to be the case, there would still be economic competition to determine
the sole surviving league and the antitrust laws would still be applicable to exercises of
monopoly power. See WEISTART & LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS, § 5.11(b) (ii) (1979).
These arguments will likely be raised again in the Oakland-Los Angeles Raiders liti-
gation now pending. NFL v. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, No. 80-5156 (9th Cir.
1980). As of this writing, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stayed a lower court
injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the NFL rule requiring approval by three-
fourths of all team owners before a league franchise can be shifted from one city to
another. The Raiders are contending the rule is an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the antitrust laws. S.F. Chronicle, Mar. 5, 1980, at 71, col. 5. Interestingly,
no labor exemption issue is involved.
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receive more for their services, under the First Refusal Rule,
placing them closer to the monetary position they would likely
occupy in a free market, it is not the result of increased compe-
tition for their services. 245  On the contrary, the increased
player revenue is a product of fixed rules, not open competi-
tion.24 6 Thus the new rule's arguably procompetitive effects 2 4 7
do not offset its restrictiveness, and it would likely be held in-
valid under a conventional Rule of Reason analysis.
On reflection, however, the hypothetical free market for
player services becomes an impossibility. It is the structured
nature of the NFL that ensures its high profits and the corre-
sponding demand for players' services.2 4 8 The league gener-
ates revenue through production of a standardized product,
245. In Smith, the circuit court summarized the United States Supreme Court's lat-
est word on the Rule of Reason, National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978):
Ending decades of uncertainty as to the proper scope of the inquiry under
the rule of reason, the Court stated categorically that the rule, contrary to its
name, 'does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason,' and that the
inquiry instead must be confined to a consideration of [the restraint's] impact
on competitive conditions.'
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1186 (emphasis added).
246. Initially, the First Refusal Rule appears to have the economically desirable ef-
fect of allowing the player's free market value-the "principle terms" of an "offer
sheet"-to dictate the salary level. However, this is illusory. It is not a player's free
market value, the amount of money a team is willing to pay him, that motivates an-
other team to make an offer, but the amount of compensation--draft choices according
to a predetermined schedule-that it will be forced to pay. In other words, the terms of
an offer sheet do not reflect open competition for a player's services. Instead, they
represent one team's decision that the player's services are worth the requisite
amount of draft picks. Of course the salary level offered determines the compensation
level and the two are positively correlated, as one increases so must the other.
In the final analysis it will be the free agent's value in terms of draft picks that will be
decisive. Because the relative value of a team's draft choices depends on the previous
years' won-lost record, as well as the owner's preference for "youth" or "veterans" and
other intangibles, the salary level of an offer sheet will not necessarily correspond to
the player's value in an open market for his services. Nevertheless, the First Refusal
Rule (draft choice-competition) remains preferable to the Rozelle Rule (a commis-
sioner's unbridled discretion).
247. Salaries will rise under the new rule, and the terms of an offer sheet should
bear at least some relation to open competition.
248. [The argument for] complete, unrestricted freedom of movement from
club to club, offering [a player's] services to the highest bidder . . . ignores the
structured nature of any professional sport based on league competition. Pre-
cise and detailed rules must of necessity govern how the sport is played, the
rules of the game, and the acquisition, number, and engagement of players.
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 287.
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athletic contests played under uniform conditions. A league
structure is essential.
NFL rules limit the number of players that may be employed
by any team at a given time,249 provide for "gate-sharing,"250
and ensure equal division of television revenues among mem-
ber clubs. 25 ' All of these measures are undoubtedly economi-
cally anticompetitive. However, they have not been the target
of antitrust attack. They are rules designed to facilitate prod-
uct uniformity and long-term league survival, to the benefit of
both owners and players.
The Rozelle Rule was an overly restrictive device unilater-
ally imposed by the league. An antitrust analysis both high-
lighted the rule's inherent unfairness and also provided a
means for its invalidation in Mackey. As a result, the players
gained a real voice in league decision-making. However, as the
First Refusal Rule demonstrates, league measures accommo-
dating the needs of the players as well as the owners, although
certainly more equitable, will not necessarily be more econom-
ically competitive.
The antitrust laws supplied the necessary leverage to enable
the players to achieve what the owners had steadfastly re-
fused: player input in formulating league rules.2 5 2 The Mackey
249. NFL labor counsel Theodore Kheel once remarked:
Now bear in mind that in professional sports no one has challenged the
agreement of the teams that there should be a limitation on the number of
players each team should employ. Can you imagine General Motors making
an agreement with Chrysler . .. ? Can you imagine what the antitrust depart-
ment would do if that kind of a [sic] agreement was entered into by compa-
nies subject to the antitrust laws?
But no one has questioned for one moment that in an industry where teams
are competing by agreement, not by the rules of competition as they apply in
ordinary industries, where they agree that they will play the same number of
games on substantially the same days and that they will seek to defeat each
other in competition in order to come back next year and compete again, no
one for one moment has said that the limitation on the number of players or
any of these other restrictions on trade violate the antitrust laws. Because
everyone realizes how ridiculous it would be if every team could go out and
hire as many players as they want or pick the days on which they want to play.
These restraints are accepted without challenge.
Panel Discussion, Professional Sports: Has Antitrust Killed The Goose That Laid The
Golden Egg?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 290, 300-02 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discus-
sion J.
250. Id. at 313. Under "gate-sharing" the home team shares the ticket revenue with
the visiting team.
251. See note 37 and accompanying text, supra.
252. During the Panel Discussion, supra note 249, at 309, Ira Millstein, plaintiff
counsel in the basketball player class action, Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.
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antitrust analysis produced welcome change. Today, however,
the NFL still functions under similar anticompetitive rules.
The fact that the players now have a greater voice in shaping
the rules does not, by itself, make them any more procompeti-
tive. As long as games played under uniform conditions are
essential to team sport entertainment, league rules will be nec-
essary to ensure a standardized product.
As a result, conventional antitrust analysis is not suited to
evaluate the competitive impact of league rules. The very
existence of the league negates the possibility of a free and
open market for player services. As long as the league struc-
ture exists,m application of antitrust principles based on the
desirability of open competition is not practical.2 5 4
Protection of the First Refusal Rule under the nonstatutory
labor exemption would not seriously undermine antitrust pol-
icy. The continued existence of the NFL, and professional
sports leagues in general, does not present an insurmountable
obstacle to overall economic efficiency. Yet, these businesses
do have a more conventional labor-management structure, and
the absence of a collectively bargained employment agreement
would contravene a strong national policy. On balance, the la-
bor interests would likely prevail, and the First Refusal Rule
should be immune from antitrust attack under the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption. The dictum in Reynolds to that effect
appears sound.2 5 5
In sum, Mackey's labor exemption provided a workable
method of dealing with the antitrust challenge which lurked in
1977), discussing a restraint often called the Basketball Rozelle Rule because of its
similarity to the former NFL rule, commented:
The antitrust laws are being used as the hammer to end, once and for all, a
total package of restraints which made it impossible for a player to negotiate
at least once in his professional career for his services with more than one
team without any restraints . ...
Once it was agreed by the basketball owners that at least once during the
life of a player's professional career, he would be able to competitively negoti-
ate without restraints for his services, in my judgment the back of the problem
was broken. The antitrust laws had been used properly to end that restraint,
that single restraint which had so restrained players all of their professional
careers.
253. Evaluation of the necessity or desirability of the league structure is beyond the
scope of this note. Therefore it is assumed that no viable alterantive exists, and a
league structure is indispensable in professional team sports.
254. The preceding analysis does not pertain to league merger questions, and is
limited to league rules designed to foster the sport-entertainment product.
255. See notes 196-97 and accompanying text, supra.
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the background of Reynolds. Yet the result there, although it
was a collectively bargained settlement, was not wholly satis-
factory. The problem stemmed from the players' failure to util-
ize their bargaining power effectively-a basic assumption
behind the labor exemption. Their lack of solidarity was high-
lighted in the class action litigation, and overcoming this weak-
ness poses perhaps the greatest challenge to future player
gains.
The Class Action and Player Unity
While the problems presented by a class action on behalf of
more than 5700 people are by no means unique to football play-
ers, they exemplify the NFLPA's difficulty in marshalling a
unified strategy for presenting player demands. Although ap-
pellants' arguments contesting the class certification were
meritorious, 256 the underlying motivation to appeal stemmed
from disagreement with the NFLPA majority over acceptance
of the new Collective Bargaining Agreement, and specifically
the First Refusal Rule. The players were divided by factional-
ism during the settlement negotiations. Besides the objector-
appellants, two groups advocating conflicting interests split the
NFLPA into the "contract security" group and the "freedom"
257
group.2s The former desired a collective bargaining agreement
and its financial security, while the latter valued free player
movement more highly and consisted of many of the Mackey
"Freedom Fighters.""2 5  This division in the players' ranks was
apparently present on February 16, 1977, the date a preliminary
collective bargaining understanding was reached.2 5 9
256. It is true, for instance, that above-average players like the appellants were
damaged by the Rozelle Rule to a greater monetary extent than other players. Be-
cause 'star' players can command higher salaries, their injuries resulting from an in-
ability to contract with the highest bidder were much larger than the average for all
players. Yet under the settlement a player playing out his option in a given year was
awarded the same amount regardless of ability or salary level. Of course, in the final
analysis, a class action must always ignore special individual needs in order to achieve
a workable resolution for the entire class. In other words, even if subclassing had been
employed under Rule 23(c) (4), the highest-valued players would inevitably receive
less than their total losses.
257. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 56.
258. Id. Kermit Alexander, the NFLPA president at the time of the Alexander
filing, was a plaintiff in Mackey and a member of the "freedom" group. His successor,
Dick Anderson, was a leader of the "contract security" group, and is characterized by
the appellants as executive director Garvey's "opponent." Id. at 29. See note 67,
supra.
259. Brief for Appellants, supra note 128, at 57. Apparently Alexander walked out of
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It was not surprising, then, that the Reynolds record con-
tained an unusually large number of personal attacks. The
principal allegation made in this regard was that class counsel
was too intimately involved with the NFLPA to represent the
class of all football players.2 60 It was undisputed that class
counsel's law firm was also counsel for the NFLPA.2 6 1 How-
ever, no concrete evidence was introduced to show that this
theoretical conflict hindered class counsel's fiduciary duty to
fairly represent the entire class. 2 6 2
The players thus lacked the necessary cohesion to utilize
their bargaining power fully, both at the bargaining table and
in the Alexander settlement negotiations. The problem was
not unequal bargaining strength, but a failure on the players'
part to focus their newly acquired strength.2 6 3 The labor ex-
emption was designed to foster arms-length collective bargain-
ing. Viewed in this light, it is apparent that the exemption has
served its purpose.
Although perhaps indirectly perpetuating some inequity
here, the Mackey labor exemption can still be a workable an-
swer to antitrust attacks and labor strife in professional sports
if both sides fully exploit their bargaining positions. One other
factor deserves consideration, however. While antitrust princi-
ples and labor policy protect the public as a whole, and are
only secondarily concerned with the fate of particular litigants,
Mackey, Alexander and Reynolds demonstrated a complete
lack of concern for the effect of their decision on the general
public. Once again, the professional sports business is unique
in this regard. Not only are the teams accountable to their pay-
ing customers, the league as a whole is the object of intense
public interest essential to the survival of the sport itself.
the negotiations in frustration about three hours before final agreement was reached.
Id. at 57 n.74. The Collective Bargaining Agreement was finalized on March 1, 1977.
260. Id. at 59-66.
261. Class Counsel, Ed Glennon, is a partner in the same Minneapolis law firm,
Lindquist & Vennum, that serves as the NFLPA's general, labor, and antitrust counsel.
Id. at 61 n.75. Interestingly, both District Judge Larson and NFLPA executive director
Garvey were at one time associated with Lindquist & Vennum. Interview with counsel
for appellants, Gerold Tockman, Nov. 15, 1978.
262. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 286.
263. The players may take some solace in the fact that professional football contin-
ues to enjoy tremendous popularity. If real unity can be achieved with the benefit of
hindsight, the NFLPA should enjoy an enviable position at the bargaining table in 1982.
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The Neglected Voice of the Public
Judge Gibson reminded the parties in Reynolds that
"[p]rofessional sports are set up for the enjoyment of paying
customers and not solely for the benefit of the owners or the
benefit of the players." 26 4 The destiny of football is ultimately
controlled by its fans: not only the fans actually attending the
games, but, perhaps more significantly, those watching on tele-
vision. The NFL negotiated a new television contract before
the 1978 season under which each NFL team will receive $20
million over a four year period.26 5 There has also been some
speculation that the Super Bowl game may eventually be aired
exclusively on pay television.2 6 6 Continued public satisfaction
is clearly in the economic interest of both owners and players.
How then may the public's interest be protected?26 7 An obvi-
ous method is through government regulation. This might take
the form of a national regulatory body under the auspices of
some federal agency.268 But such a national body is likely to be
insensitive to local needs, and would inevitably evolve into a
largely inefficient bureaucracy.269 At least in the short run, the
most desirable path appears to be through local legislation.
Most teams enjoy stadium tax subsidies in some form,27 0 and
the majority of stadiums used by professional teams were built
with public funds. 271 For example, legislation requiring re-
duced ticket prices for the community's poor and elderly might
be a logical step. Each locality has its own priorities, and there
is nothing in the league structure to prevent teams from being
264. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d at 287.
265. See note 37, supra.
266. See S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 23, 1969, at 37, col. 5.
267. The discussion following is equally applicable to all professional team sports,
but only the barest outline of a few available alternatives is undertaken here. This is
an area in need of a more exhaustive inquiry. See Note, supra note 28, at 77-96.
268. Id. at 82-95. For a detailed summary of public regulation of sports, see WEIS-
TART & LOWELL, supra note 244, at §§ 2.01-2.22.
269. "Experience with public regulation in other agencies gives reason to doubt the
wisdom of establishing a federal sports commission. In general, regulating bodies tend
to give most of their attention to the interests of groups that are effectively represented
in the formal proceedings of the agency, while overlooking the interests of groups that
are not effectively represented." Noll, supra note 19, at 424.
270. "It is estimated that by charging low rents, foregoing property taxes, and pay-
ing the stadium's operating losses, local governments subsidize teams by more than
$25 million annually." Kennedy & Williamson, supra note 18, at 71.
271. "70% of the stadiums and arenas used by pro franchises have been built with
public funds, and they are piling up an indebtedness that will cost taxpayers some $6
billion through the turn of the 21st century." Id.
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responsive to local needs. Nevertheless, in order to realize
such measures, some type of fan coordination is necessary.
Much like the players in the late 1960's, fans must band to-
gether to accomplish real change. The Ralph Nader creation,
F.A.N.S. (Fight to Advance the Nation's Sports), was a step in
the right direction.2 7 2 What is essential at a minimum is con-
sumer awareness. Fans are the consumers of the professional
sports entertainment product both at the stadium and on tele-
vision. When consumers dislike an aspect of a product, and in-
dividual complaints are not effective, the way to be heard is
through collective action. Local governments have to be re-
sponsive to their constituents, and professional sports teams to
their attendance and television ratings. Through consumer-
ism, the public interest in professional sports can be meaning-
fully represented.
Conclusion
The last two decades have witnessed momentous change in
professional sports. No longer do team owners and league offi-
cials unilaterally dictate their sport's destiny. The players,
through unionization and antitrust attacks, have gained a
strong foothold in league decisionmaking.
Professional football has survived perhaps the most bitter
conflict, but the struggle continues. The federal courts were
drawn into the battle in Mackey, where the NFL's Rozelle Rule
was found to be invalid under the antitrust laws. Recognizing
the uniqueness of the business of football and the expertise of
the parties involved, the Mackey court outlined a workable la-
bor exemption to the antitrust laws. This exemption gives the
272. At this writing, F.A.N.S. remains largely dormant. Born as a Nader brain-child
the organization soon fizzled into obscurity as a result of financial difficulties. During
the spring of 1979, Ernie Wallerstein took over the reins and attempted to bring
F.A.N.S. back to life. Unfortunately, he was unable to overcome the fundraising
problems. Apparently neither the public nor the government is willing to supply the
necessary financial backing, and fans seem unwilling to take collective action through
boycotts, fundraising, or otherwise. Mr. Wallerstein has helped to accomplish some
minor victories. Typical was the San Francisco Parks Department's reluctant decision
to roll back hot dog prices by $.05 at Candlestick Park after much cajoling by Waller-
stein and others. Presently, such actions can only be accomplished through individual
efforts. There is simply not sufficient public interest to support an organization like
F.A.N.S. However, Wallerstein does not believe that a government organization can be
a viable alternative. Interview with Ernie Wallerstein, July 12, 1979. See Kazin, FANS
Makes Waves, Berkeley Barb, Feb. 15-28, 1979, at 16, col. 1; Vincent, Pro Team Sports
Fans Demand Rights, S.F. Sunday Chronicle & Examiner, Sept. 10, 1978, § B, at 3, col. 1.
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judiciary a practical means of avoiding complex antitrust in-
quiries into the atypical economics of professional team sports.
It is triggered when the challenged practice is the product of
good faith negotiations on a mandatory subject of bargaining
and affects primarily the players and the owners.
The Mackey labor exemption allows the players and owners
to develop mutually acceptable rules on player movement
without fear of antitrust liability. Judicial restraint is desirable
in antitrust attacks on such rules. Regardless of the
much-argued propriety of player restraints in professional
team sports, they are not a suitable subject of antitrust exami-
nation. Team sports of necessity operate under a league struc-
ture, and although teams compete on the playing field, they
must cooperate to produce a sound entertainment product. As
contemplated in antitrust analysis, there will never be an open
market for player services under a league structure.
The Alexander-Reynolds class action settlement is illustra-
tive. Although the settlement was negotiated concurrently
with a new Collective Bargaining Agreement adopting a rule
arguably as restrictive as the Rozelle Rule, both courts stead-
fastly refused to evaluate the rule. The players may have re-
ceived a less-than-desirable deal in the end, but this is
primarily attributable to internal conflicts.
The players have fought hard to achieve a position of power
roughly equivalent to that of the owners, and have succeeded,
but the third party intimately involved in professional sports,
the fans, are not represented. The public, the consumers of the
sports-entertainment product, must band together to achieve a
real voice in the future of professional sports. This can only be
accomplished through consumerism-increased awareness
and joint action. In this manner, professional team sports may
eventually meet the needs of all three groups.
442 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
